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It is no surprise to professional practitioners of the law that people make 
mistakes.  Indeed, the vast majority of professional practitioners earn a 
livelihood rectifying individuals’ mistakes through litigation, legislation, or 
leverage.  The same practitioners are aware that rectification is best 
accomplished by proactive measures, vigilance to those issues that engender 
mistakes, and through active reparation, thus avoiding mistakes themselves.  
Issues prompting litigation are engendered by change to the law, to the economy, 
or to the intentionality of individuals in flux.  Anticipating the effect of change 
on individuals is the best way for practitioners to avoid mistakes. 
The spate of litigation surrounding federal preemption of state statutes 
pertaining to wealth transfer, resulting in unanticipated consequences of 
significant economic import, illustrates many professionals are imprudently 
advising clients with whom they owe a fiduciary obligation.  Two forms of 
fiduciary irresponsibility occur in this connection.  First, professionals engage 
clients in a fiduciary capacity when serving as estate planners or divorce 
                                                 
 Professor of Law, Columbus School of Law, The Catholic University of America; Visiting 
Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.  The author is grateful for the research and 
editorial assistance of Samuel Mott and Davis C. Rajtik. 
434 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 67:432 
practitioners.1  Second, benefit plan managers engage in a fiduciary relationship 
when providing routine forms and guidelines to employees with the knowledge 
that the benefits involve pension or insurance plans governed by the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), a federal program governing assets 
in excess of $6.7 trillion as of 2015.2  
When working with clients, estate planners and plan managers are inattentive 
to the possibility of change in the client’s life, the intricacies of federal 
preemption, and the interaction of the two.  As such, these attorneys and plan 
managers are not discharging their fiduciary duties in respect to a pension or 
insurance plan in a manner consistent with the interests of the participants and 
beneficiaries.3  Specifically, professionals are acting imprudently when advising 
clients—or neglecting to advise clients—of the options available when the client 
commences employment or subsequently, makes a significant status change 
affecting assets so significant as a pension or insurance contract. 
The imprudence of both types of professionals may first arise from 
inattentiveness to estate planning options surrounding beneficiary designations, 
and is often augmented by the failure to take adequate account of the inevitability 
of changing circumstances in the participant’s life.  Secondly, imprudence may 
arise from the inattentiveness of ERISA plan managers regarding the forms used, 
lack of periodic follow-up with clients and employees, and through failure to 
assist a client with identifying intended beneficiaries.  The failure of plan 
managers to provide plan beneficiary designation forms that are sufficiently 
comprehensive to capture the vagaries of human lifestyle changes is flagrant.  
Attorneys and plan managers are somewhat aware of federal preemption, 
specifically that ERISA explicitly contains a preemption clause, and that there 
are multiple federal decisions applying that preemption to policy designations 
covered under ERISA, the Federal Employees’ Group Life Insurance Act 
(FEGLIA), and the Servicemen’s Group Life Insurance Act (SGLIA).4  As a 
result of these judicial opinions, plan managers and attorneys are aware that 
federal preemption often contradicts the intent of a client, resulting in the unjust 
                                                 
 1. See John H. Langbein, What ERISA Means by “Equitable”: The Supreme Court’s Trail 
of Error in Russell, Mertens, and Great-West, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1317, 1319 (2003). 
 2. S. Burcu Avci, M.P. Narayanan, & H. Nejat Seyhun, How Should Retirement Plans be 
Organized?, 13 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 337, 339 (2017); see Stewart E. Sterk & Melanie B. Leslie, 
Accidental Inheritance: Retirement Accounts and the Hidden Law of Succession, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
165, 168–69 (2014) (noting “Americans currently hold more than $9 trillion in retirement savings 
accounts”). 
 3. Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (2012). 
 4. Id. § 1144(a); see Hillman v. Maretta, 133 S. Ct. 1943, 1951, 1955 (2013) (holding state 
law is preempted because it conflicts with FEGLIA, an insurance program for federal employees); 
see, e.g., Egelhoff v. Egelhoff ex rel. Breiner, 532 U.S. 141, 142 (2001) (holding that contrary state 
laws are preempted by the plan term’s benefit mandate). 
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enrichment of the designated plan beneficiary.5  Often, because the individual 
named on the benefit form does not correspond with a client’s intent, the advisers 
and plan managers are inattentive to the “central matter of plan administration.”6  
Divorce is the most likely culprit—the former spouse receives the proceeds of 
the plan even though this cannot be what was intended by the now deceased 
client.7  This inattentiveness to the plan beneficiary designation, either when 
commencing employment or at divorce, is not a frivolous pursuit because the 
proceeds of the plan often form a significant component of the client’s estate.8 
To illustrate the dilemma, consider a new employee who, as part of his or her 
employment, participated in his or her employer’s ERISA-sponsored pension 
plan.  The employee designates his spouse as the plan designated beneficiary 
and then directs that if there is no surviving spouse at his death, distribution is 
to be made by his estate.  After completing the form and filing it with the 
employer’s plan manager, the employee and his spouse subsequently divorce 
and the divorce decree purportedly divests the employee’s spouse of any interest 
in the plan.  The employee’s attorney never included a qualified domestic 
relations order (QDRO) as part of the divorce settlement and thereafter, despite 
good intentions, the employee never removed the former spouse’s name as the 
plan’s designated beneficiary.  At the employee’s death, the former spouse and 
the deceased employee’s estate vie for the plan’s benefits, usually a substantial 
amount of money.  The estate asserts the divorce severed any relationship 
between the decedent and the former spouse, and also asserts the divorce decree 
contained a valid waiver of any benefits signed by the former spouse.  
Additionally, state law provides that a former spouse is treated as predeceased 
for all inheritance purposes!  Nonetheless, the former spouse argues the 
employee retained the plan designated beneficiary due to residual “good will” 
between the two parties and also alleges that ERISA, FEGLIA, and SGLIA are 
federal plans mandating federal preemption, emphasizing that the person named 
as the plan’s designated beneficiary takes despite conflicting state law.  The 
issue becomes who takes the proceeds? 
Attorneys and laypersons alike might rationally assume the former spouse is 
barred from taking because of the valid divorce decree and the signed settlement 
agreement between the two parties.  If this is insufficient, the state’s revocation 
by operation of law statute treats each spouse as predeceased upon divorce, and 
operationally bars the former spouse from taking.  Surprising to many plan 
participants, that is not the case.  ERISA and related programs require the plan 
to pay benefits strictly in accordance with the plan’s designated beneficiary rule 
                                                 
 5. See John H. Langbein, Destructive Federal Preemption of State Wealth Transfer Law in 
Beneficiary Designation Cases: Hillman Doubles Down on Egelhoff, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1665, 1665 
(2014). 
 6. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 147–48 (holding that making payment to the designated plan 
beneficiary is central to administrative efficiency). 
 7. See Sterk & Leslie, supra note 2, at 206–07. 
 8. See id. at 168–69. 
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based on the argument that this simplifies plan administration.9  Ease of plan 
administration, unhindered by various state law, the goal of Congress was to 
make certain that the employee remained in charge of the designated 
beneficiary.10  However, Congress failed to take into account the changes in 
American society between ERISA’s enactment in 1974 and today.  These 
changes often thwart an employee’s intent. 
Of course, private actions can prevent an unintended plan beneficiary from 
taking the proceeds but one Supreme Court decision illustrates how such actions 
routinely fail to materialize.11  First, if the attorney representing the employee at 
the divorce hearing provided comprehensive advice, a QDRO could be filed, 
thus defeating the spouse’s ability to take from the pension.  As is often the case, 
this was not done.12  Second, the plan manager could provide the employee with 
more options on the plan’s enrollment form when the employee began 
employment with the company.  Third, the plan manager could continue to 
notify the employee in an effort to remain current on the intent of the employee.  
The employment form, meant to explain the plan and its procedures, can easily 
illustrate certain changes such as divorce, remarriage, or even the birth of 
children or nonmarital cohabitation.  Neither the plan manager nor the forms 
provided to the employee offered these options, and there was no periodic 
follow-up to inquire of the employee’s current goals.13  All the while, assets in 
the managed account continued to increase.  Fourth, should the employee seek 
assistance in creating an estate plan with an attorney, either before or after the 
divorce, the estate planning professional can counsel the employee to change the 
designated beneficiary on the form to correspond with the employee’s current 
estate intentions.  This was not done.14  There was no suggestion made in writing 
by the plan manager, nor encouragement given, to direct the employee to seek 
adequate legal advice.15 
This Article argues there is sufficient evidence available to suggest that 
private practitioners, involved in divorce litigation or estate planning, are in 
breach of fiduciary duty to their clients when they fail to consider the impact of 
federal preemption.  Second, plan managers of ERISA, FEGLIA, and SGLIA 
are imprudently providing pension plan forms to employees by failing to take 
into account the vagaries of modern lifestyle changes.  While this Article focuses 
                                                 
 9. Kennedy v. Plan Adm’r for DuPont Sav. & Inv. Plan, 555 U.S. 285, 300–01 (2009) 
(stating that strict adherence to the plan beneficiary documents allows for a more simplistic and 
efficient estate administration process).  The result occurs if the plan involved life insurance or 
disability insurance proceeds too.  See, e.g., Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 149–50 (holding that state statutes 
prescribing a constructive knowledge standard for plan administrators are preempted, as they 
conflict with ERISA’s policy of minimizing administrative and financial burdens). 
 10. See Kennedy, 555 U.S. at 303–04 (citing Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 148–50). 
 11. See id. at 288. 
 12. Id. at 296–97.   
 13. See id. at 289–90. 
 14. Id. at 303. 
 15. See id. at 301–02. 
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on plan managers, the liability of both groups is at issue.  ERISA imposes 
stringent standards on persons acting as ERISA fiduciaries,16 stipulating that 
ERISA fiduciaries must “discharge [their] duties with respect to a plan solely in 
the interest of the participants and the beneficiaries . . . .”17 An ERISA fiduciary 
is thus confronted with the duties to prepare and maintain enhanced beneficiary 
designation forms that consider the evolving intent of the 
employee/accountholder, necessitating regular employee inquiries that require a 
fiduciary to act upon the newly received information.  This is in the interest of 
the participants and beneficiaries.  Likewise, divorce attorneys and estate 
planning attorneys, once immune from claims brought by third parties due to the 
rule of privity, are now increasingly subject to suits for breach of duty, 
negligence, and malpractice.18 
Plan managers and attorneys often fail to apprise themselves of changes in the 
law.19  One significant change is the evolution of state probate statutes which 
traditionally accommodated the elusive intent of a decedent within the context 
of a last will and testament, but now include beneficiary designations on 
nonprobate transfer contracts, such as with pension funds or life insurance 
contracts.20  Illustration of the evolution of these state statutes are the following 
statutes: revocation by operation of law, antilapse, slayer statutes, elective share 
computations, constructive trusts, and in a handful of states: substitute gift 
rules.21  Despite uniform codes promulgated by the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, and attendant greater uniformity among 
state rules and laws, state laws continue to lack uniformity, resulting in 
differences of application.  Any lack of uniformity conflicts with ERISA’s 
mandate of ease of administration.  Uniformity, simplicity of application, and 
                                                 
 16. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21) (2012); see also 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-8, D-2, D-3 (2005) 
(persons whom establish and maintain the framework are engaged in fiduciary acts); Donovan 
v. Bierwirth, 680 F.2d 263, 272–73 n.8 (2d Cir. 1982) (holding the fiduciary duty under ERISA is 
the “highest known to the law”); see generally Langbein, supra note 1, at 1324–25. 
 17. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1). 
 18. See Fabian v. Lindsay, 765 S.E.2d 132, 140 (S.C. 2014) (holding that an attorney can be 
held liable for malpractice); Tamposi Assocs., Inc. v. Star Mkt. Co., 406 A.2d 132, 134 (N.H. 1979) 
(holding third-parties may seek a remedy in court when the promisor had reason to know that a 
benefit to a third party is contemplated by the promisee as one of the motivating causes for the 
contract); see also Gerry W. Beyer, Avoid Being a Defendant: Estate Planning Malpractice and 
Ethical Concerns, 5 ST. MARY’S J. LEGAL MAL. & ETHICS 224, 231–32 (2015); Stephanie B. 
Casteel et al., The Modern Estate Planning Lawyer: Avoiding the Maelstrom of Malpractice 
Claims, 22 PROBATE & PROP. 46, 49 (2008). 
 19. See Casteel et al., supra note 18, at 48. 
 20. Sterk & Leslie, supra note 2, at 168–69. 
 21. See id. at 178–81, 196, 199, 205 (discussing the issues and applications of antilapse, 
elective share computations, constructive trusts, and substitute gift statutes in light of the ERISA 
beneficiary designation); see also Katherine A. McAllister, A Distinction Without a Difference? 
ERISA Preemption and the Untenable Differential Treatment of Revocation-On-Divorce and 
Slayer Statutes, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1481, 1488–89, 1494–95 (2011) (discussing the rise of revocation-
on-divorce and slayer statutes and their subsequent analogous treatment in the lower courts). 
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ease of administration are terms that federal courts frequently use to preempt 
application of contrary state laws, all in conformity with the United States 
Constitution’s Supremacy Clause.22 
The federal preemption cases are both expansive and comprehensive.23  As 
illustration, a progression of Supreme Court decisions document that ERISA’s 
integrity relies upon the principle that “[e]very employee benefit plan shall be 
established and maintained pursuant to a written instrument.”24  The written 
instrument is meant to be simple, containing a designated beneficiary that may 
not be overridden by extraneous arguments that a designated beneficiary is 
displaced as result of a divorce,25 allegation of a federal common law waiver,26 
the imposition of a constructive trust,27 or because the designated beneficiary 
signed a marital settlement agreement.28  Since each of these legal arguments 
can be addressed differently among the states, any incorporation of state law into 
plan administration jeopardizes the simplicity intended by Congress, and 
therefore necessitates the federal preemption of state laws conflicting with 
ERISA.  In addition to the simplicity of the plan’s written instrument, there are 
ample judicial holdings affirming the primacy of the plan’s designated 
beneficiary rule, thereby underpinning the argument that both estate planners 
and pension fund administrators are in breach of their fiduciary responsibility to 
                                                 
 22. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; see, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 181–83 (1824) 
(preempting state law that conflicted with federal laws licensing companies engaged in coastal 
trade). 
 23. ERISA excludes from preemption “any law of any State which regulates insurance, 
banking, or securities.”  29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A).  There is also an exemption for qualified 
domestic relations orders (QDROs), which create an alternate payee’s right to, or assigns to an 
alternate payee the right to, receive all of or a portion of the benefits payable with respect to a 
particular plan.  See id. §§ 1056(d)(3)(B)(i), 1144(b)(7); see also State Farm Life & Accident 
Assurance Co. v. Goecks, 184 F. Supp. 3d 701, 708 (W.D. Wis. 2016).  Federal decisions depart 
from the actual words of the federal statute and instead ask whether the state statute is an obstacle 
to accomplishing the objectives of the federal statute.  See Daniel J. Meltzer, Preemption and 
Textualism, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1, 16 (2013). 
 24. 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1). 
 25. See, e.g., Egelhoff v. Egelhoff ex rel. Breiner, 532 U.S. 141, 147 (2001) (holding that 
contrary state laws are preempted by the plan term’s benefit mandate); see also Hillman v. Maretta, 
133 S. Ct. 1943, 1954–55 (2013) (holding state law is preempted because it conflicts with FEGLIA, 
an insurance program for federal employees). 
 26. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Plan Adm’r for DuPont Sav. & Inv. Plan, 555 U.S. 285, 304 (2009) 
(holding that any federal common law of waiver signed by a participant’s ex-spouse did not invoke 
ERISA’s antialienation provision). 
 27. See, e.g., Bostic v. Bostic, No. 6:14-2130-BHH, 2015 WL 5178163, at *5 (D.S.C. Sept. 
3, 2015) (holding a constructive trust does not avoid the preemptive effect of ERISA); see also 
Carmona v. Carmona, 603 F.3d 1041, 1061–62 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that any constructive trust 
created by a state court is preempted by ERISA). 
 28. See, e.g., Cunningham v. Hebert, No. 14C9292, 2016 WL 6442180, at *3–4 (N.D. Ill. 
Nov. 1, 2016) (holding that because the settlement agreement did not qualify as a qualified domestic 
relations order (QDRO) it was preempted by ERISA’s plan designation rule). 
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plan holders when failing to provide guidance to clients concerning options 
pertaining to any plan’s beneficiary.29 
Multiple lawsuits arise because plaintiffs are astounded when insurance or 
pension benefits are paid to an individual whom the decedent is divorced, and 
usually divorced for a lengthy period of time.  Admittedly, the accountholder 
failed to update his or her plan’s designated beneficiary form even though there 
was sufficient time to do so.30  This common mistake flows from the plan 
manager’s responsibility to update the intent of the accountholder.31 The 
fiduciary duty of the plan manager includes providing proper forms to capture 
employee intent, to make consistent periodic inquiry, to anticipate change and 
the possibility of unintended consequences, and to avoid mistakes as prudently 
as possible under the prevailing circumstances.32  Currently, the vast majority of 
plan managers fail to provide this level of accountability.33 
To illustrate the failure of fiduciary responsibility, consider divorce—the 
parallel process of signing a financial settlement agreement that purportedly 
disclaims any interest in the other party’s property, division of all marital 
property, and any attendant support obligations.  Without a valid QDRO, even 
the most precise settlement agreement is insufficient to revoke an ERISA-
governed plan’s designated beneficiary.34  Even the use of a constructive trust, 
which bars the former spouse from becoming “unjustly” enriched, cannot negate 
the ERISA-plan’s designated beneficiary from taking the proceeds.35  Similarly, 
state statutes are ineffective substitutes for attorney and plan manager initiative.  
To illustrate, the general population is often familiar with revocation by 
operation of law statutes which occur upon the issuance of a final decree of 
divorce.36  The modern approach treats the former spouse as predeceasing the 
testator for purposes of taking from the testator upon death.37  These statutes 
apply to last wills and testaments and increasingly to nonprobate transfers such 
as the contracts illustrated in ERISA cases.38  Therefore, in relying upon an 
understanding of local statutes, common practice, or traditional common sense, 
practitioners and clients may assume a last will and testament is revoked in 
whole or in part upon the occurrence of a valid final decree of divorce.  This 
                                                 
 29. See Langbein, supra note 1, at 1346. 
 30. See, e.g., Kennedy, 555 U.S. at 303–04.  Two months had elapsed between divorce and 
death for decedent to change the beneficiary.  Id.  There were eleven years between divorce and 
decedent’s death to change the beneficiary, but it was not changed.  See Cunningham, 2016 WL 
6442180, at *4 
 31. See Beyer, supra note 18, at 236. 
 32. See Sterk & Leslie, supra note 2, at 201. 
 33. See id. at 201–02. 
 34. See id. at 197–98. 
 35. Carmona v. Carmona, 603 F.3d 1041, 1061–62 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 36. See Sterk & Leslie, supra note 2, at 195–96. 
 37. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 20-111.1 (2017). 
 38. See id. 
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error, illustrated by a plethora of federal decisions involving ERISA, FEGLIA, 
and SGLIA, is discussed throughout this Article.39  These decisions highlight 
the inapplicability of state statutes and the error of many plan managers and 
attorney practitioners, who inattentively or negligently assume that local law 
supplants Congressional mandates. 
Plan managers and estate planning attorneys are familiar with the increase in 
the number and use of nonprobate transfers, a transformation that concurrently 
unfolded with the enactment of ERISA in 1974, and which now eclipses probate 
wealth transfers.40  As a result of historical precedent, states vigilantly enacted 
statutes to accommodate a testator’s intent in the context of probate, intestacy, 
and last wills and testaments.41  However, the same attentiveness is not 
consistently true with nonprobate transfers, insurance contracts, and pension 
fund accounts within nonprobate transfers.  In addition, with nonprobate devices 
there exists far less uniformity among the states in reference to divorce and 
revocation of designated beneficiaries through attendant operation of law 
statutes.42  Adding to this diversity of state application is that many practitioners 
consider ERISA’s provisions daunting and mistakenly assume ERISA pertains 
only to federal law—unworthy of proper review.43  Nonetheless, assets and 
employees governed by ERISA are increasing with the utilization of ERISA-
governed nonprobate benefit plans.44  This is complicated by the significant 
probability of divorce among employees/accountholders.45  The unintended 
consequences of fiduciary inattention to ERISA’s strict adherence to the plan’s 
designated beneficiary rule is economically significant.  Many former spouses 
are unintended beneficiaries of ERISA type plans because they are the plans’ 
designated beneficiaries.46  This reality precipitated an outcry from renowned 
commentators railing against federal preemption of traditional state sovereignty 
                                                 
 39. See discussion infra Section I.A–C. 
 40. See John H. Langbein, The Nonprobate Revolution and the Future of the Law of 
Succession, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1108, 1129 (1984); see generally Melanie B. Leslie & Stewart E. 
Sterk, Revisiting the Revolution: Reintegrating the Wealth Transmission System, 56 B.C. L. REV. 
61, 63 (2015) (“For many people planning their estates, the will is now the least important document 
in their estate plan.”). 
 41. See Leslie & Sterk, supra note 40, at 62–63. 
 42. See generally Adam J. Hirsch, Disclaimers and Federalism, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1871, 
1905–06 (2014) (describing the lack of uniformity among the states in matters of probate and 
practice). 
 43. See id. at 1904–07. 
 44. See Langbein, supra note 5, at 1694. 
 45. See Marriage and Divorce, AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N, http://www.apa.org/topics/divorce/ 
(last visited Feb. 14, 2018) (“[A]bout 40 to 50 percent of married couples in the United States 
divorce.  The divorce rate for subsequent marriages is even higher.”). 
 46. See Jeff Landers, Divorcing Women—Know the Laws Affecting Your Beneficiary 
Designations, FORBES (April 9, 2015, 11:38 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jefflanders/2015/0 
4/09/divorcing-women-know-the-laws-affecting-your-beneficiary-designations/#685df46045ed. 
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over wealth transfer at death.47  Omnipresent and ever resolute, the fact remains 
that ERISA requires uniformity, clarity, and simplicity.  If an accountholder 
completes a beneficiary designation form, that designated beneficiary will 
receive the proceeds regardless of any local law or practice.  It does not appear 
that federal preemption will decrease, thus furthering a continuation of 
unintended consequences. 
The Article discusses another option which uses ERISA’s provisions 
prompting plan managers and practitioners to take a fiduciary approach to the 
plan’s participants and designated beneficiaries.  Decisions reveal justifications 
for this approach.  First, the scope of ERISA policy applying federal preemption, 
specifically how ERISA relies upon uniformity of plan application and how even 
the slightest variation found in state laws would impede the simplicity of that 
application.  Second, the federal refusal to accommodate state laws and practices 
precipitates mistakes that resulting in a spate of lawsuits and judicial opinions 
evidencing a pattern of relentless federal preemption.  This Article discusses 
ERISA’s preemptory policy and its intransigent application.  First, courts are 
rejecting a theory of unjust enrichment by which the plan’s designated 
beneficiary restoring any payments made under the ERISA-governed plan, if the 
beneficiary’s disqualification is established under the state’s revocation by 
operation of law statute.48  Second, whether an ERISA-governed designated 
beneficiary can waive his or her rights to the proceeds of the plan through 
disclaimer—a valid settlement agreement that references the proceeds and that 
was voluntarily entered into at the time of the divorce.49  Third, there may exist 
a federal common law permitting federal courts to rely upon state law to permit 
avoidance of the designated plan beneficiary in a manner similar to what state 
courts allow.  It appears such a policy already exists in reference to state slayer 
statutes, however, the argument is that federal common law should be expanded 
to include revocation by operation of law upon divorce.50  The issue is not that 
these three arguments are unavailing but rather, they solidify ERISA’s particular 
administrative goals and more deeply ensconce federal supremacy as a reality.  
This reality is difficult for state practitioners to accommodate as they are 
accustomed to local control over matters pertaining to domestic relations and 
probate.51  Federal preemption will not abate.  Indeed, as one commentator 
                                                 
 47. See, e.g., Langbein, supra note 5, at 1666 (“Egelhoff and Hillman will saddle American 
wealth transfer law with needlessly contradictory federal and state rules, sometimes applicable to 
different transfers by the same transferor.”); see also Lawrence W. Waggoner, The Creeping 
Federalization of Wealth-Transfer Law, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1635, 1662–63 (2014) (“The Supreme 
Court’s Egelhoff and Hillman decisions and the Treasury regulations regarding U.S. government 
securities in survivorship form have thoughtlessly and needlessly barred the unification effort for 
federally authorized or regulated nonprobate transfers.”). 
 48. See, e.g., Langbein, supra note 5, at 1678–79. 
 49. See, e.g., MacInnes v. MacInnes, 677 N.W.2d 889, 889–95 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004) 
(Murphy, J., concurring). 
 50. See Langbein, supra note 5, at 1690–93. 
 51. See Hirsch, supra note 42, at 1877–78. 
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writes, “[a]t least within the area of trusts and estates, that giant has slumbered 
for a long time, and has yet to throw his weight around in a big way, so to 
speak.”52 
Faced with trillions of dollars passing under ERISA plans, this Article argues 
that, despite repeated appeals to the contrary, the designated beneficiary in the 
ERISA plan document controls and professional practitioners of the law must be 
attentive to the possibility of status changes applicable to vested or contingent 
plan beneficiaries.53  As a response to this fact, it is the responsibility of both the 
plan managers providing the forms and follow-up inquiry, as well as estate 
planning attorneys working with clients at divorce and in planning estate plans 
where there is disposition of assets managed by ERISA.  Each of these groups 
is responsible for providing superior plan beneficiary designation forms and, 
when employed by a past, current, or future ERISA employee, to raise the issue 
of status change and provide the proper advice and direction.  The mechanism 
for enforcing this fiduciary responsibility is through 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)’s 
accommodation of appropriate equitable relief.  Equity demands that plan 
managers and attorneys developing plans for clients respond in a prudent fashion 
or risk being held accountable for breach of fiduciary responsibility. 
I. ASSUMPTIONS CONTRIBUTING TO MISTAKES 
A. Ascendance of Nonprobate Transfers 
Assumptions concerning divorce, waivers, and marital agreements are the 
subject of mistake due to three significant developments.  First, upon death, the 
manner of testamentary wealth transfer in the United States shifted from passing 
predominantly through a last will and testament, what is referred to as probate, 
to more convenient, less expensive, and more prevalent nonprobate transfers 
such as contracts payable at death, inter vivos trusts, and joint accounts.54 
Professor Langbein provides a good summary of the evolution of wealth transfer 
devices: 
The older probate system of court-supervised transfer has been 
increasingly displaced by a nonprobate system in which financial 
intermediaries (including banks, insurers, mutual funds, and pension 
plans) transfer the owner’s account balance on death.  Beneficiary 
designations on financial accounts tend ever more to do the work of 
                                                 
 52. Id. at 1929. 
 53. See, e.g., Egelhoff v. Egelhoff ex rel. Breiner, 532 U.S. 141, 146 (2001) (holding that 
ERISA’s preemption mandates that any fiduciary administer benefits in accordance with the 
documents and instruments governing the plan). 
 54. Reference to this is made in the Prefatory Note to Article II, Intestacy, Wills, and Donative 
Transfers, Uniform Probate Code (2014), listing it as one of the four themes prompting a systematic 
review of the Code.  The trend was identified in Revisiting the Revolution.  Leslie & Sterk, supra 
note 40, at 63; see also Langbein, supra note 40, at 1129. 
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family wealth transmission that used to be done in the probate 
process.55 
A characteristic of nonprobate plans is that they provide for a standardized 
form designation by which to identify a designated beneficiary—often a current 
spouse.56  This standardization may produce unintended consequences, resulting 
in a designated beneficiary taking under a nonprobate transfer’s form 
designation even though this was not intended by the creator of the interest when 
he or she completed the form.57  Additionally, many transfer devices, 
“dramatically increased the dollar volume of assets likely to pass outside the 
probate system.”58 
Traditionally, there was scant reference to nonprobate transfers in any state 
wealth transfer statute that involved revocation of spouses, most statute 
addressed wills only.59  Gradually, states adopted revocation by operation of law 
provisions applicable to nonprobate devices.60  State statutes typically provide 
that once a valid final decree of divorce is rendered, the former spouse is treated 
as predeceasing the testator for purposes of taking under a will, intestate, or 
through nonprobate device.61  Without such state statutes, a former spouse 
receives nonprobate transfers, including insurance or pension benefits, from a 
decedent who, while happily married, listed the former spouse as the designated 
beneficiary.62  Most often, after a final divorce decree ends the marriage, the 
employee spouse neglects to change the designated beneficiary from the former 
spouse to a new beneficiary—often a new spouse.63 The unintended 
consequences of this are illustrated in the following facts: 
                                                 
 55. Langbein, supra note 5, at 1694. 
 56. See id. at 1665. 
 57. See id. at 1694–96. 
 58. Leslie & Sterk, supra note 40, at 63. 
 59. See id. at 67. 
 60. Refer to Applying Revocation-on-Divorce Statutes to Will Substitutes, for a history of 
revocation by operation of laws statutes.  Susan N. Gray, Applying Revocation-on-Divorce Statutes 
to Will Substitutes, 18 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L. J. 83, 85–100 (2004).  As an illustration of states 
ignoring the impact of divorce on nonprobate transfers, note “both Illinois and New Hampshire law 
provide that divorce automatically revokes provisions in both wills and revocable trusts that pertain 
to exspouses.  Neither, however, extends this rule to beneficiary designations in contracts, such as 
life insurance, IRAs or POD provisions.”  Leslie & Sterk, supra note 40, at 67 (citing 755 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. 5/4-7(b) (2012); 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/2-6(b); 760 ILL. COMP. STAT. 35/1 (2012); 
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 551:13(II) (2007)) (footnotes omitted). 
 61. Gray, supra note 60, at 84. 
 62. See Leslie & Sterk, supra note 40, at 67. 
 63. See Leslie A. Shaner, When Clients Fail to Change Beneficiary Designations, FAMILY 
LAW. MAG. (Sept. 8, 2016), http://familylawyermagazine.com/articles/beneficiary-designations/ 
(“The most common situation is that a deceased ex-spouse has failed to change the beneficiary 
designation/survivorship election for a nonprobate asset to either his/her new spouse or to anyone 
else, e.g., the parties’ children; and, the living ex-spouse remains as the designated beneficiary on 
the nonprobate asset.”); see also Mary Ellen Signorille et al., Current Challenges and Best 
Practices Concerning Beneficiary Designations in Retirement and Life Insurance Plans,  DEP’T OF 
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[S]uppose that soon after her marriage, a testator executes a will 
naming her husband as her beneficiary.  Thereafter, she accumulates 
a mutual fund account, and, as part of her employee-benefits package, 
a 401K and a life insurance policy.  She names her husband as the 
death beneficiary of all the nonprobate assets.  After the testator and 
her husband go through an acrimonious divorce, the testator dies 
unexpectedly before engaging in any post-divorce estate planning.  
Will the ex-husband be entitled to any of the testator’s assets? 
If the testator were domiciled in a state with a modern revocation-on-divorce 
statute, the ex-husband would not be entitled to any of the testator’s probate 
assets or the proceeds of the mutual fund account.  Due to the ERISA preemption 
rule, he would collect the proceeds of the employer-provided retirement account 
and life insurance policy. 64 
Gradually, modern state statutes, prompted by the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL), included nonprobate 
transfer devices within their state revocation by operation of law statutes.65  
These statutes still varied among the states, but most treated a former spouse—
and sometimes his or her relatives—as predeceasing the policy-holder and 
thereby excluded from taking as a beneficiary under a last will and testament, as 
well as under nonprobate transfer devices.66  Unfortunately, these uniform laws 
are not uniform among the states, “[u]nlike the Uniform Commercial Code, the 
Uniform Probate Code and related products have never gained anything close to 
universal adoption, but they did succeed in stirring things up, encouraging more 
states to codify and to reexamine and fiddle with statutes already in place.”67  
While most state statutes treat a divorced spouse as deceased when probating the 
last will and testament of the other spouse, what occurs when that divorced 
spouse is listed as a designated beneficiary of nonprobate assets remains less 
than uniform in application. 
All ERISA, FEGLIA, and SGLIA plans offer designated beneficiaries, a form 
of nonprobate device often not addressed in state revocation by operation of law 
                                                 
LABOR 3 (Dec. 2012), https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/ebsa/about-ebsa/about-us/erisa-
advisory-council/2012-current-challenges-and-best-practices-concerning-beneficiary-
designations-in-retirement-and-life-insurance-plans.pdf  (reporting that “[t]he most common and 
frequently contentious disputes occur where participants marry or divorce but fail to update their 
beneficiary designations to reflect this change of status before their death”). 
 64. Leslie & Sterk, supra note 40, at 68. 
 65. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-804 cmt. (amended 2010). 
 66. See, e.g., id. § 2-804(d) (“Provisions of a governing instrument are given effect as if the 
former spouse and relatives of the former spouse disclaimed all provisions revoked by this section 
or, in the case of a revoked nomination in a fiduciary or representative capacity, as if the former 
spouse and relatives of the former spouse died immediately before the divorce or annulment.”).  
See also Gray, supra note 60, at 100–02. 
 67. Hirsch, supra note 42, at 1905. 
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statutes.68  Thus, to hold state statutes applicable to these federal plans involves 
the administration of the plan under different state laws.  Such a result is 
anathema to the ease of administration mandated by Congress.  Regardless what 
the state revocation by operation of law statute provides, Congress, in enacting 
ERISA, “had an implicit interest in ensuring that ‘the insurance proceeds will be 
paid to the named beneficiary and that the beneficiary can use them.’”69 
Neither the prevalence of nonprobate devices nor the increasing amount of 
dollars under management will abate.  Congress is not incentivized to amend 
federal legislation to permit revocation by operation of law similar to what is 
done in the States.  Understandably, Congress is willing to permit 
employees/accountholders to make the decisions necessary to change the 
designation.70  Replacing one beneficiary with another is a simple matter.  The 
responsibility lies with plan managers to offer the option of revocation by 
operation of law on the form at the time of employment.71  Furthermore, there 
exists a duty on plan managers to make inquiry of the employees afterward, to 
better identify the intent of the employee and to incentivize the employee to 
make the change.72  This is prudent when planning for the needs of the 
participants and beneficiaries. 
Wealth transfer shifted toward nonprobate transfers and a corresponding 
accommodation by plan managers is therefore, appropriate.  This shift is similar 
to what occurred with spousal equality law which began in the 1970s, providing 
equality of ownership and management of marital property.73  Estate planners 
and Congressional action developed and implemented procedures by which this 
shift was accommodated, by enacting provisions accommodating state 
QDROs.74  Today, plan managers must accommodate the high incidence of 
                                                 
 68. See Laura A. Rosenbury, Federal Visions of Private Family Support, 67 VAND. L. REV. 
1835, 1852 (2014). 
 69. See id. at 1852 (citing Hillman v. Maretta, 133 S. Ct. 1943, 1953 (2013)).  ERISA applies 
to pension plans such as 401(k) plans, welfare plans including life insurance, medical and disability 
insurance, education programs, child care, and severance.  See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1)–(2); see 
also JOHN H. LANGBEIN & BRUCE A. WOLK, PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW 175–218 
(3d ed. 2000). 
 70. See Rosenbury, supra note 68, at 1852; see also Mary Ellen Signorille et al., supra note 
63, at 3. 
 71. See Avci et. al., supra note 2, at 354. 
 72. See Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 502–03 (1996) (“ERISA itself specifically 
requires administrators to give beneficiaries certain information about the plan . . . .  And 
administrators, as part of their administrative responsibilities, frequently offer beneficiaries more 
than the minimum information that the statute requires-for example, answering beneficiaries’ 
questions about the meaning of the terms of a plan so that those beneficiaries can more easily obtain 
the plan’s benefits.  To offer beneficiaries detailed plan information in order to help them decide 
whether to remain with the plan is essentially the same kind of plan-related activity.”) (citations 
omitted). 
 73. See Raymond C. O’Brien, Integrating Marital Property into a Spouse’s Elective Share, 
59 CATH. U. L. REV. 617, 620–23 (2010). 
 74. See id. at 688. 
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divorce, the mistakes that employees/accountholders make when they fail to 
update plan beneficiary forms, and that the major estate asset is the ERISA 
pension fund or insurance policy.  To date, few plan managers present clients 
with comprehensive plan forms, or fail to make inquiry to update designated 
beneficiaries.75  Enforcing equitable relief under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) will 
prompt better forms and inquiry. 
B. Equality of Spouses 
During the period that nonprobate transfers became increasingly prevalent, 
the perspective of family law, particularly marriage but also custody and support 
obligations, shifted from a male-dominated focus to a characterization of the 
relationship as one of shared economic partnership between two equal 
partners.76  Gradually, spouses were, through statute and common law, 
increasingly considered as co-owners of property acquired during the marital or 
community period.77  Even though one spouse might work only in the home, 
both spouses are now deemed equal owners of wealth acquired during the course 
of the marriage.78  This process of equalization proceeded at the federal and state 
levels.  Illustrative of this equality of ownership was the enactment of ERISA,79 
although ERISA’s primary goal was to provide security of retirement for 
employees.  Nonetheless, later legislation ensured that spouses are preferred 
beneficiaries at death, subject to displacement only with consent.80  ERISA was 
signed into law on Labor Day of 1974, designed to protect the pension benefits 
of workers and to safeguard the rights of the workers’ beneficiaries properly 
designated on the pension benefit forms.81  Ten years later, the Retirement 
                                                 
 75. See Sterk & Leslie, supra note 2, at 224, 228–30. 
 76. See O’Brien, supra note 73, at 620–23. 
 77. Id. 
 78. CAL. FAM. CODE § 2550 (West 2016).  Specifically, the California code reads: 
Except upon the written agreement of the parties, or on oral stipulation of the parties in 
open court, or as otherwise provided in this division, in a proceeding for dissolution of 
marriage or for legal separation of the parties, the court shall, either in its judgement of 
dissolution of the marriage, in its judgement of legal separation of the parties, or at a later 
time if it is expressly reserves jurisdiction to makes such a property division, divide the 
community estate of the parties equally. 
Id.  Equality of spouses was intended to apply at death, not just at divorce, as is illustrated in the 
Uniform Probate Code elective share provision.  See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-202 cmt. 
(“The revision of this section is the first step in the overall plan of implementing a partnership or 
marital-sharing theory of marriage.”). 
 79. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), Pub. L. No. 93–406, 88 
Stat. 829 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461 (2012)); see generally PAUL J. 
SCHNEIDER & BRIAN M. PINHERO, ERISA: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE § 1.03 (3d ed. 2008).  For 
an explanation of how the enactment of ERISA made defined-benefit plans less attractive to 
employers, refer to Accidental Inheritance.  Sterk & Leslie, supra note 2, at 170–75. 
 80. See Retirement Equity Act of 1984 (REA), Pub. L. No. 98-397, 98 Stat. 1426 (1984). 
 81. See, e.g., Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 845 (1997).  Two other federal statutes likewise 
protect any beneficiary named in the plan documents.  See Hillman v. Maretta, 133 S. Ct. 1943, 
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Equity Act of 1984 (REA) was enacted.82  The REA strengthened the rights of 
a surviving spouse by providing the surviving spouse with an income stream 
after a worker’s death.  The REA’s preface provides that the new legislation is 
meant to: 
[I]mprove the delivery of retirement benefits and provide for greater 
equity under private pension plans for workers and their spouses and 
dependents by taking into account changes in work patterns, the status 
of marriage as an economic partnership, and the substantial 
contribution to that partnership of spouses who work both in and 
outside the home, and for other purposes.83 
Equality of spouses is recognized in the two legislative acts, but “ERISA 
provides that at the accountholder’s death, the accountholder’s surviving spouse 
(if any) shall be the beneficiary of any remaining assets, unless the spouse has 
properly waived that right.”84  Of further note, “[d]epending on the 
circumstances, a surviving spouse has a right to a survivor’s annuity or to a 
lump-sum payment on the death of the participant, unless . . . the participant has 
eliminated the survivor annuity benefit or designated a different beneficiary.”85  
To minimize interference from states with conflicting goals and policies, ERISA 
specifically preempts “any and all State laws insofar as they may now or 
hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan.”86  By enacting the preemption 
                                                 
1947–55 (2013) (discussing Federal Employees’ Group Life Insurance Act of 1954 (FEGLIA)) and 
Bostic v. Bostic, No. 6:14-2130-BHH, 2015 WL 5178163, at *5–6 (D.S.C. Sept. 3, 2015) 
(discussing the Servicemen’s Group Life Insurance Act (SGLIA)). 
 82. See generally Retirement Equity Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-397, 98 Stat. 1426.  The 
REA modified the rules to allow for a surviving spouse to receive benefits when he or she is either 
married for at least one year prior to the participant’s retirement, see 29 U.S.C. § 1055(f)(1) (2012), 
or if married to the participant—but must be married to the participant at least one year prior to his 
or her death, see § 1055(f)(2). 
 83. Retirement Equity Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-397, 98 Stat. 1426.  The Act provided 
three enhancements to ERISA’s protection of spouses of accountholders: (1) more pension plans 
were covered; (2) pension plans were required to name spouses as beneficiaries of specified 
survivorship benefits; and (3) any change in such statutory designations requires the written consent 
of the accountholder’s spouse.  Id. § 103, § 203, § 207. 
 84. Sterk & Leslie, supra note 2, at 172–73 (referencing 26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(11)–(13) (2006)); 
see generally DAVID A. PRATT & SHARON REECE, ERISA AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW 24–26 
(2010). 
 85. Kennedy v. Plan Adm’r for DuPont Sav. & Inv. Plan, 555 U.S. 285, 293–94 (2009) (citing 
29 U.S.C. § 1055(a), (b)(1)(C), (c)(2) and Boggs, 520 U.S. at 843). 
 86. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a); see Gobeille v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 136 S. Ct. 936, 943 (2016) 
(discussing the scope of ERISA’s preemption).  But see 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (stating ERISA 
excludes from preemption any law of any state that regulates insurance, banking, or securities).  
There is also an exception for qualified domestic relations orders (QDROs), which create or 
recognize the existence of an alternate payee’s right to, or assignment to an alternate payee the right 
to, receive all or a portion of the benefits payable with respect to a participant under the retirement 
plan.  See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1144(b)(7), 1056(d)(3)(B)(i)(I); see also State Farm Life & Accident 
Assurance Co. v. Goecks, 184 F. Supp. 3d 701, 703 (W.D. Wis. 2016) (holding the designated 
beneficiary must take policy proceeds unless there is a valid QDRO). 
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provision, Congress wanted to ensure that plans and plan sponsors are subject to 
a uniform body of benefit law, the goal being to minimize administrative and 
financial burdens associated with complying with conflicting state directives, or 
between states and the federal government.87 
C. Federal Preemption of State Laws 
ERISA and preemption of state laws illustrate another significant 
development in the law of wealth transfer: the gradual but relentless inroads 
made by federal law into an area historically dominated by state legislation.88  
Commentators suggest that federal preemption may continue unabated.  
Professor Adam J. Hirsch observes that: “[a]t least within the arena of trusts and 
estates, that giant has slumbered for a long time, and he has yet to throw his 
weight around in a big way, so to speak.”89  So too, Professor Lawrence W. 
Waggoner, a Reporter for the Restatement (Third) of Property: Wills and Other 
Donative Transfers, the Uniform Probate Code, and the Uniform Statutory Rule 
Against Perpetuities, writes that: 
Because of the raw power granted to the federal government by the 
Constitution, federal law is the elephant in the room, even in a 
traditional state-law sphere as wealth transfer law.  It is distressing 
indeed that those who produce that elephant often—not always, but 
often—seem oblivious to the damage they can do and have done to 
well-considered state law.90 
Traditionally, state courts and state legislatures were the arbiters of both 
family law and intergenerational wealth transfers.  In 1858, the Supreme Court 
decision of Barber v. Barber91 established the federal exception to domestic 
relations jurisdiction.  The exception developed to mean that state courts decide 
matters of divorce, child custody, and visitation.92  There are of course 
exceptions, most illustrative are when Congress enacts laws pertaining to 
                                                 
 87. See Singer v. Black & Decker Corp., 964 F.2d 1449, 1452 (4th Cir. 1992). 
 88. See Waggoner, supra note 47, at 1637. 
 89. Hirsch, supra note 42, at 1929. 
 90. Waggoner, supra note 47, at 1663 (“This Constitution, and the laws of the United States 
which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the 
authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every State 
shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary 
notwithstanding.” (referencing the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution Article 
VI)). 
 91. Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. 582, 584 (1858) (“We disclaim altogether any jurisdiction in 
the courts of the United States upon the subject of divorce, or for the allowance of alimony, either 
as an original proceeding in chancery or as an incident to divorce a vinculo, or to one from bed and 
board.”).  In 1992, Justice White based the domestic relations exception in the power of Congress 
to grant jurisdiction under Article III of the Constitution.  See Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 
689, 697 (1992). 
 92. See id. at 700–07. 
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domestic violence or child kidnapping and abduction.93  Ostensibly, there 
remains a federal exception to domestic relations jurisdiction.  This policy is 
referenced in the 1982 Supreme Court decision of Santosky v. Kramer.94  Justice 
Rehnquist wrote that domestic relations “has been left to the States from time 
immemorial, and not without good reason.”95  Since ERISA’s employment 
perspective is national, so are an increasing number of domestic relations 
matters, some involving international consequences, and Congress is reluctant 
to enact federal legislation forcing states to accommodate their own laws.96 
Similarly, in reference to intergenerational wealth transfers, state statutes and 
judicial opinions historically provided the mechanism by which wealth was 
transferred from one generation to the next through intestacy, last wills and 
testaments, and now nonprobate transfer.97 While there is no history of judicial 
opinions carving out a “wealth transfer exception” to federal jurisdiction, state 
sovereignty assumed authority because of English precedent and the practical 
observation that localities are better suited to gauge any inexpertly expressed 
intent of the locals.98  A noted teacher and author, Professor Thomas E. 
Atkinson, captured both the genesis and the rationale behind local control of 
wealth transfer when observing that, “[c]ourts of probate are close to the people; 
one can be found in every county, and in Connecticut at practically every 
crossroad.”99  States consistently assumed the role of probate, perhaps because 
the wealth of decedents was local wealth, thus localities are better suited to 
estimating the intentionalities of their constituents.100  State intestate law is a 
good illustration of this process.  Each state enacted statutes based on what was 
perceived to be the decedent’s intent.  Then, the intestate statute distributes any 
of the decedent’s property that does not pass under a valid will or nonprobate 
device.  Unsurprisingly, intestate statutes vary widely among the States. 
                                                 
 93. See id. (discussing the progression of the exceptions). 
 94. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769–70 (1982). 
 95. Id. at 770 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 96. One example was Congress’s enactment of the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 
1980 (PKPA), 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (2000), to address interstate custody jurisdiction problems.  By 
enacting PKPA, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws was forced to 
revise its Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act to accommodate the federal basis of jurisdiction, 
enacting the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act of 1997.  See William J. 
Howe & Hugh McIsaac, Finding the Balance: Ethical Challenges and Best Practices for Lawyers 
Representing Parents When the Interests of Children Are at Stake, 46 FAM. CT. REV. 78, 80 (2008). 
 97. See Reid Kress Weisbord, Federalizing Principles of Donative Intent and Unanticipated 
Circumstances, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1931, 1931–32 (2014). 
 98. Id. at 1933–35. 
 99. THOMAS E. ATKINSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF WILLS 29 (1953). 
 100. See id. 
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Commentators debate whether the intentionality of the decedent was captured 
correctly, and consensus as to intentionalities is rare.101  The decedent was 
always able to provide for other intended beneficiaries.  Overall: 
[M]uch of state wealth transfer law was either created to, or does in 
fact, effectuate donative intent by filling gaps created by the donor’s 
inability to predict future events.  Other examples include the trust law 
modification doctrines; powers of appointment; the repose of 
discretion in a trustee; doctrines of ademption, accession, satisfaction, 
and abatement; rules governing pretermitted spouses and children; the 
requirement of testamentary capacity; and the slayer rule.102 
It is understandable that federal preemption of established wealth transfer 
procedure in each of the states causes commentators, attorneys, and state 
legislators to strenuously object.  For example, a few members of the Supreme 
Court raise concern over the literal interpretation given to the ERISA’s 
preemption clause.103 
There are multiple arguments suggesting that federal preemption is 
unwarranted.  Justice Breyer, with whom Justice Stevens joined, wrote a blanket 
preemption interpretation will produce an “avalanche of litigation,” threatening 
results that Congress could not foresee.104  Instead, their approach being to 
“‘respect’ the ‘separate sphere[e]’ of state ‘authority’”105 and where “the state 
statute before us is one regarding family property—a ‘fiel[d] of traditional state 
regulation,’ where the interpretative presumption against pre-emption is 
particularly strong.”106  Similarly, Justice Thomas urges restraint when applying 
preemption of state laws, “[u]ntil we confront whether Congress had the 
constitutional authority to pre-empt such a wide array of state laws in the first 
place, the Court—and lower courts—will continue to struggle to apply § 1144 
[preemption].”107  Justice Thomas also wrote, “[p]re-emption analysis should, 
therefore, instead hew closely to the text and structure of the provisions at issue, 
and a court should find pre-emption only when the ‘ordinary meaning’ of duly 
enacted federal law ‘effectively repeal[s] contrary state law.”108 
In an effort to reduce preemption, some justices suggest that federal 
preemption may be drifting into unconstitutionality,109 others argue for 
enforcement of a presumption against preemption.110  Still, others question 
                                                 
 101. See, e.g., Alyssa A. DiRusso, Testacy and Intestacy: The Dynamics of Wills and 
Demographic Status, 23 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 36, 57–58 (2009). 
 102. Weisbord, supra note 97, at 1934–35. 
 103. Egelhoff v. Egelhoff ex rel. Breiner, 532 U.S. 141, 153–54 (2001) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 104. Id. at 153–54. 
 105. Id. at 160. 
 106. Id. at 163. 
 107. Gobeille v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 136 S. Ct. 936, 949 (2016) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 108. Hillman v. Maretta, 133 S. Ct. 1943, 1955 (2013) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 109. See, eg., Gobeille, 136 S. Ct. at 949 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 110. Id. at 954 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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whether any state law presents an impermissible connection with an ERISA 
plan.111  Professors Sterk and Leslie offer the following insight: 
Other instruments reflecting the accountholder’s intent, including 
wills, revocable trust instruments, and the terms of divorce decrees, 
count little in the face of the accountholder’s failure to change the 
beneficiary designation form he or she filled out years earlier.  Major 
life events, such as marriage, the birth of new family members, and 
the death of others, have little or no effect on distribution of the 
account unless the accountholder had the presence of mind to change 
the beneficiary designation.112 
Increasingly, cases evidence a willingness to preempt state laws, mostly 
because of what Justice Breyer characterizes as “serious administrative 
problems.”113  Justice Breyer explains that “[i]f each State is free to go its own 
way, each independently determining what information each plan must provide 
about benefits, the result could well be unnecessary, duplicative, and conflicting 
reporting requirements, any of which can mean increased confusion and 
increased cost.”114  The rationale underlying preemption is ease of 
administration of an array of ERISA accounts.  Justice Kennedy, writing in 
Gobeille v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., summarized the rationale for federal 
preemption concluding that, “Pre-emption is necessary in order to prevent 
multiple jurisdictions from imposing differing, or even parallel, regulations, 
creating wasteful administrative costs and threatening to subject plans to wide-
ranging liability.”115  Even if state law traditionally regulated fields, such as 
domestic relations, ERISA’s preemption still applies because Congress 
“certainly contemplated the pre-emption of substantial areas of traditional state 
regulation.”116 
Justice Thomas defers to the historical status of state sovereignty, and noted 
commentators such as Professor John Langbein, while admitting that “under the 
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, Congress has the power to forbid the 
                                                 
 111. Id. (citing N.Y. State Conf. of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 
U.S. 645, 668 (1995)). 
 112.  Sterk & Leslie, supra note 2, at 201, 207 (adding also that “[f]orms that lead the 
accountholder to name a spouse as the primary beneficiary of an ERISA-governed account present 
the most egregious example of how designation forms take too little account of potential life 
changes”). 
 113. Gobeille, 136 S. Ct. at 949 (Breyer, J., concurring); see also Fort Halifax Packing Co., 
Inc. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 11 (1987) (holding Congress intended for ERISA to provide a uniform 
set of administrative procedures). 
 114. Gobeille, 136 S. Ct. at 949. 
 115. Id. at 939; see also Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 497 (1996) (holding that Congress 
sought to avoid complexity and administration costs because these would discourage employers 
from adopting the benefit plans). 
 116. Gobeille, 136 S. Ct. at 946 (citing Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enf’t v. Dillingham 
Constr., N.A., Inc., 519 U.S. 316, 330 (1997)). 
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application of state wealth transfer law to a federally authorized account,”117 this 
power should not be inferred from silence.118  Professor Langbein suggests that 
something more is needed in the text of the federal statute to permit preemption, 
“[t]he inference that should have been drawn from ERISA’s silence on these 
matters is that Congress did not intend to displace such state laws, especially in 
view of the ‘presumption against preemption in areas of traditional state 
regulations such as family law.’”119  Additionally, commentators argue that 
matters traditionally left to the states, such as family law and wealth transfer, 
should be particularly insulated from federal preemption.120 Professor Langbein 
argues the Court long deferred to state domestic relations law, a deference 
recognized by Congress121 with codified enforcement of state marital property 
decrees through QDROs:122 
Accordingly, the divorce revocation problem . . . did not come into 
discussion and was not addressed in [the federal] legislation, but the 
principle embodied in the QDRO regime—deference to state law on 
marital property matters incident to divorce—invited extension to 
state divorce revocation statutes, contrary to the Court’s decision [on 
preemption].123 
Professor Langbein argues the Court demonstrates “mistaken assumptions” 
and “unfamiliarity” with basic principles of trust law, suggesting instead that 
states are better informed as to wealth transfer law.124  Furthermore, Professor 
Langbein argues that revocation by operation of law occasioned by divorce “is 
an issue about which federal law provides no direction and expresses no federal 
interest.”125  Instead, by “preventing state law from doing its customary work of 
interpreting the meaning of beneficiary designations, federal preemption 
needlessly defeats the core policy of wealth transfer law, to implement the 
transferor’s intent.”126 
                                                 
 117. Langbein, supra note 5, at 1671. 
 118. Id. at 1674. 
 119. Id. at 1676 (referencing Egelhoff v. Egelhoff ex rel. Breiner, 532 U.S. 141, 152 (2001)). 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. (referencing De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 580 (1956) as support for the 
proposition that there is no federal law of domestic relations, which is primarily a matter of state 
concern). 
 122. Langbein, supra note 5, at 1676 (referencing the Retirement Equity Act of 1984, Pub. L. 
98-397, 98 Stat. 1426 (1984)). 
 123. Id. at 1677. 
 124. Id. at 1695–96 (referencing Hillman v. Maretta, 133 S. Ct. 1943, 1957 (2013) (Alito, J., 
concurring)).  Specifically, Langbein writes: “The Court’s disinterest in the purpose of the divorce 
revocation rule also meant that the Court had no understanding of the magnitude of the harm that 
the preemption rule would cause.”  Id. at 1696. 
 125. Id. at 1677. 
 126. Id. (referencing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE 
TRANSFERS § 10.1 (AM. LAW INST. 2003)). 
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Professor Lawrence Waggoner, another legal commentator with notable 
credentials in the area of decedents’ estates laments the Court’s departure from 
the “intent-effecting divorce-revocation rule for federally authorized or 
regulated nonprobate payments” and for the Court’s unawareness of the 
“decades-long movement toward unifying the law of probate and non-probate 
transfers.”127  Professor Waggoner, a Reporter for the Uniform Probate Code, is 
not only concerned about federal preemption of state divorce revocation by 
operation of law statutes, but that federal preemption erodes state advances that 
permit including nonprobate transfers in what is termed the “augmented estate” 
of a decedent spouse.128  Additionally, because federal preemption demands that 
the plan beneficiary designation controls, “neither a subsequent marriage, the 
birth of a child, a divorce, nor the death of a beneficiary can affect the beneficiary 
designation.  Any applicable omitted-spouse, omitted-child, or antilapse 
statutes, as well as state statutes that revoke beneficiary designations on divorce, 
are preempted by ERISA.”129  The scope of federal preemption is undetermined, 
but presently Professor Waggoner views it as a direct threat to utilization of 
augmented estate. 
The augmented estate is increasingly utilized among the States as a statutory 
mechanism to include nonprobate transfers within the estate of a decedent 
spouse, permitting his or her surviving spouse to claim a portion of nonprobate 
transfers when a third party is named as the beneficiary and where a disappointed 
spouse seeks a portion.130  Currently, “[a]bout thirty-seven percent of the non-
community property states . . . extend their elective-share laws to nonprobate 
transfers.”131  In effect, by augmenting the estate, a surviving spouse is able “to 
elect” a portion of the marital estate that includes any transfer termed 
nonprobate, such as joint bank accounts, multiple party accounts, pay on death 
and transfer on death accounts, joint tenancy in real estate, life insurance, 
revocable trusts, and pension retirement contracts, annuities with a death benefit, 
Totten trusts, and any account with a right of survivorship.132  Since the majority 
of wealth transfers outside of probate,133 augmented estate provides a surviving 
spouse with a significant tool for recapturing marital property after the death of 
the spouse holding title. 
Professor Waggoner is concerned the states permitting use of augmented 
estate may see the practice preempted by federal courts.  He suggests that 
                                                 
 127. Waggoner, supra note 47, at 1642. 
 128. Id. at 1643. 
 129. Sterk & Leslie, supra note 2, at 186. 
 130. See O’Brien, supra note 73, at 715–17. 
 131. Waggoner, supra note 47, at 1643.  For a complete discussion of augmented estate and its 
evolution, refer to Integrating Marital Property into a Spouse’s Elective Share.  See generally 
O’Brien, supra note 73. 
 132. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 7.1 
(AM. LAW INST. 2003). 
 133. Waggoner, supra note 47, at 1638. 
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ERISA, amended by the REA, extends federal protection to the surviving spouse 
of an employee spouse’s ERISA-covered pension plan.134  Nonetheless, the 
Retirement Equity Act of 1984 does not apply to federal life insurance policies, 
protected under FEGLIA, nor does it apply to the National Service Life 
Insurance Act of 1940, or to SGLIA.135  FEGLIA and SGLIA may preempt any 
conflicting state statute such as one mandating that a surviving spouse’s right to 
include insurance within a spouse’s augmented estate for election purposes.  As 
such, Professor Waggoner concludes that “except for ERISA-covered plans, a 
decedent’s surviving spouse has no protection with respect to federal statutes 
authorizing or regulating nonprobate transfers.”136  Relying on federal 
preemption, and in direct contravention to state augmented estate statutes, 
“[s]pouses who want to disinherit their surviving spouses need only convert as 
much of their liquid wealth as possible to U.S. government securities in 
survivorship form with third-party donees, so that as little as possible remains 
for their surviving spouses.”137  In other words, because federal preemption 
applies to FEGLIA and SGLIA, state augmented estate statutes are powerless to 
reach assets held in any policy governed by these federal programs.  Federal 
preemption bars them from inclusion in the augmented estate. 
Commentators argue that federal preemption of state law should only occur 
when Congress specifically provided for such,138 but as the nation becomes less 
local, there must arise some instances when national policy is justified.  
Admittedly, some argue the “federalization of wealth transfer law creates 
potential for harmful disruptions to settled and well-considered substantive state 
law policies governing inheritance, property succession, and wealth transfer.”139 
Nonetheless, an argument may be made in favor of federal preemption because 
federal rules, “formulated and applied uniformly throughout the United States 
by Congress and federal courts, can afford citizens a number of benefits.”140  
Among the benefits are fewer expenses associated with different rules and 
information costs, promotion of uniformity, minimizing uncertainty stemming 
from conflicts of law, and “a centralized legal system has the capacity to fill gaps 
in the law more rapidly than a decentralized one, again mitigating 
                                                 
 134. Id. at 1643–44. 
 135. Id. at 1644.  Professor Waggoner describes the application of the insurance programs with 
corresponding preemption issues.  See Hillman v. Maretta, 133 S. Ct. 1943, 1947 (2013); Ridgeway 
v. Ridgeway, 454 U.S. 46, 60 (1981) (involving the Servicemen’s Group Life Insurance Act of 
1965); Wissner v. Wissner, 338 U.S. 655, 660–61 (1950) (involving the National Service Life 
Insurance Act of 1940). 
 136. Waggoner, supra note 47, at 1644. 
 137. Id. at 1645 (citing Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 670 (1962) (holding contrary state law is 
preempted) and In re Estate of Scheiner, 535 N.Y.S.2d 920, 921–22 (Sur. Ct. 1988) (holding federal 
law preempts the elective share of the surviving spouse)). 
 138. See, e.g., Langbein, supra note 5, at 1676–77. 
 139. Weisbord, supra note 97, at 1944. 
 140. Hirsch, supra note 42, at 1874. 
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uncertainty.”141  Plus, there is a consensus that uniformity provides ease of 
administration, an argument discussed in regards to ERISA’s policy 
underpinnings. 
There is one last argument in support of state law application and resistance 
of the uniformity provided by federal preemption.  Commentators long 
associated with the development of state regulation of probate or similar 
developments in family law share Professor Waggoner’s concern over the all-
encompassing impact of federal law on state laws and procedures developed 
over centuries.142  The spate of cases involving state revocation by operation of 
law statutes is only one instance of the conflict.143  State laws are better equipped 
to capture the intent of an employee/accountholder, now divorced and deceased, 
but having amassed assets to be distributed to those intended.  Presumptively, 
the divorced accountholder did not intend for the surviving plan designated 
beneficiary to receive the plan’s proceeds; since the employee was divorced for 
some time.  The accountholder intended to change the beneficiary but neglected 
to do so.  It was a mistake not to change the beneficiary on the plan. 
Presumptively, the plan manager who provided the plan designation form to the 
employee at the commencement of employment knew that ERISA required the 
designated beneficiary to receive the proceeds, but the manager did not provide 
a form accommodating divorce or any other change in the accountholder’s life.  
Likewise, the decedent’s attorney who facilitated the divorce or prepared 
decedent’s estate plan, was presumptively aware of state revocation by operation 
of law statutes, but did not advise the client of the need to change the beneficiary 
designation when representing the accountholder at the divorce, or to prompt a 
change to the estate plan.  Perhaps the attorney thought that the state’s revocation 
by operation of law statute would apply, or alternatively, that the couple’s 
divorce decree incorporating a waiver of outstanding financial interest derived 
from the other party, voided the designation.  Both assumptions are a mistake. 
Arguably, the decedent made a mistake because of neglect, but at what point 
should plan managers or the accountholder’s divorce or estate planning attorney 
be held responsible for negligently failing to prudently advise the client.  “The 
burgeoning case law suggests that far too few lawyers understand the intricacies 
of estate planning with respect to retirement-plan assets.”144  Mistakes are 
common to all people, one White House report concludes many individuals “do 
not understand the most fundamental concepts and terminology in investing . . . 
most Americans lack the requisite knowledge to protect them from outright 
                                                 
 141. Id. at 1874–75. 
 142. See, e.g., Gray, supra note 60, at 126 (suggesting that federal law, including ERISA, 
should defer to state law on wealth transfer); Langbein, supra note 5, at 1694–96; Rosenbury, supra 
note 68, at 1869 (commenting that understandings of family formation and exit are becoming 
increasingly federalized). 
 143. Gray, supra note 60, at 100–09. 
 144. Sterk & Leslie, supra note 2, at 211. 
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financial fraud.”145 There is growing evidence of increased concern over 
breaches of fiduciary duty by plan managers—financial breach being the most 
common allegation: 
For example, pension plan beneficiaries have filed several lawsuits 
accusing fiduciary-executives of breaching their fiduciary duty by 
failing to sell the company stock held by their pension plans before the 
stock price dropped.  Critics have pointed to evidence of sub-optimal 
diversification: more than twenty-seven percent of all employees hold 
at least half of their 401(k) balances in company stock and nearly 
seven percent have their entire account in company stock.  In response 
to the concern that fiduciary-executives may not always act in the 
interest of the fund beneficiaries, some corporations have hired 
independent fiduciaries to handle the trading of company stock in their 
own employee pension funds.146 
Very recently, greater fiduciary accountability was invigorated through the 
Department of Labor’s enforcement of a new rule under which brokers and 
investment advisers for defined contribution plans, the ERISA model, are to be 
subjected to higher fiduciary standards.147  Furthermore, investment advisers are 
required to recommend investment products with the “best interest” of the 
beneficiaries in mind.148  Logically, greater focus must evolve to encompass the 
fiduciary responsibility of plan managers to provide employees with adequate 
forms to capture life changes.  Additionally, plan managers should be required 
to make inquiry of employees so as to accommodate the employee’s intent as 
life events unfold.  The issue is whether the plan manager fiduciary duty 
encompasses providing the accountholder with a form that accommodates his or 
her intent throughout changing life circumstances.  Under 29 U.S.C. § 
1132(a)(3), ERISA provides such a duty. 
II. ERISA POLICY PRECIPITATING PREEMPTION 
A. ERISA Policy 
Employers often provide their employee with retirement accounts, now taking 
the form of defined-contribution plans, as opposed to defined-benefit plans.149  
Defined contribution plans grew in popularity because they provide financial 
incentives to employees to plan for retirement savings with a safe and efficient 
program to which the employer often contributes funds.150  For employers, the 
                                                 
 145. Avci et al., supra note 2, at 350. 
 146. Id. at 365–66. 
 147. Id. at 340–41. 
 148. See, e.g., Lisa Beilfuss, How the Fiduciary-Rule Review is Likely to Play Out, WALL ST. 
J. (Feb. 9, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-the-fiduciaryrulereview-is-likely-to-play-out-
1486660677. 
 149. Avci et al., supra note 2, at 349. 
 150. Id. at 348. 
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plans are part of a motivation program that entices new employees; they are easy 
to join, and they provide a mechanism to promote savings among employees.151  
The success of the program is illustrated in a comment by Justice Breyer, 
concurring in one Supreme Court decision, citing an amicus brief submitted by 
the American Benefits Council reporting that “ERISA-based health plans 
provide benefits to 93 million Americans,”152 a significant portion of the 
working population. 
Before ERISA’s defined contribution plans, many participants or their 
beneficiaries who qualified for pension or welfare benefits were denied their 
promised benefits even though they dutifully paid into them.153  Companies 
declared bankruptcy or simply defrauded employees because participants were 
not informed of plan terms or there were issues with the solvency of the plan 
itself.154  Public inquiries ensued and government committees formulated a plan 
to guarantee employees benefits.155  By 1974, federal policy, and hence ERISA, 
viewed retirement accounts as beneficial to the nation and Congress concluded 
“[that it was] desirable in the interests of employees and their beneficiaries, and 
to provide for the general welfare and the free flow of commerce, that disclosure 
be made and safeguards be provided with respect to the establishment, operation, 
and administration of such [ERISA] plans.”156   This came about because: 
ERISA required the employer to deposit contributions into a common 
fund and to pay retirement benefits from the fund as they matured to 
individual employees. The payout amount must be described in the 
plan documents and usually take the form of an annuity for employee’s 
life, the joint lives of the employee and a beneficiary, a specified term, 
or some variation of the three.157 
The plans are designated as 401(k) or 403(b) accounts, which are governed by 
ERISA.158 
                                                 
 151. Despite the availability of these plans, fifty-six percent of Americans hold less than ten 
thousand dollars in their retirement accounts, and one in three Americans hold no reported 
retirement savings.  Avci et al., supra note 2, at 338–39 (citing Elyssa Kirkham, 1 in 3 Americans 
Have Saved $0 for Retirement, TIME (March 14, 2016), http://time.com/money/4258451/retire 
ment-savings-survey/). 
 152. Gobeille v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 136 S. Ct. 936, 949 (2016) (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 153. Albert Feuer, Who is Entitled to Survivor Benefits from ERISA Plans?, 40 JOHN 
MARSHALL L. REV. 919, 923 (2007). 
 154. Id. at 923 (citing EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW, INTRODUCTION TO THE FIRST EDITION 
XCIV-XCV (2000)). 
 155. See id. 
 156. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (2000). 
 157. Sterk & Leslie, supra note 2, at 172; see also DAVID A. PRATT & SHARON REECE, ERISA 
AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW 5–7 (2010); JAMES A. WOOTEN, THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT 
INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974: A POLITICAL HISTORY 271 (2004); Stephen F. Befort, The 
Perfect Storm of Retirement Insecurity: Fixing the Three-Legged Stool of Social Security, Pensions, 
and Personal Savings, 91 MINN. L. REV. 938, 953 (2007). 
 158. These plans allow both employees and employers to make tax-deferred contributions—
defined contributions—into retirement savings accounts administered by the employer.  See Sterk 
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Overall, ERISA produced a number of revolutionary innovations: (1) The 
fiduciary burden was shifted to employees because they made investment 
decisions related to goals, by holding more of the employer’s stock than 
otherwise permitted; (2) Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) were permitted, 
allowing employees to roll over their portfolios after an employment change or 
retirement; and (3) rollovers prompted a significant increase in assets held in 
IRAs, so that by the end of 2015 IRA assets totaled $7.3 trillion.159 
ERISA was enacted to provide all Americans with assistance in planning for 
a financially secure retirement.  To bolster this goal, and to provide uniformity 
and ease of administration, Congress mandated that ERISA “supersede any and 
all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit 
plan.”160  Preemption of conflicting state laws is necessary because such conflict 
“interferes with nationally uniform plan administration.”161  While some 
employers are exempted from participation, ERISA covered the vast majority of 
the country’s employees.  For example, government employment plans are not 
covered,162 church plans are exempt unless they choose to be covered,163 and 
businesses where the only employees are the owner and the owner’s spouse are 
exempt.164  Every ERISA plan must be established and maintained pursuant to 
a written instrument that is easy to understand,165 and the plan must establish the 
manner of conducting payment—referencing the plan’s designated 
beneficiary.166 Vesting of benefits occurs early due to the accrual of benefits 
                                                 
& Leslie, supra note 2, at 172 (citing Harvey B. Wallace II, Retirement Benefits Planning Update, 
20 PROB. & PROP. 59 (2006)).  A 401(k) plan is an employer-sponsored, defined-contribution plan 
that permits all employees the option to save for retirement as a deduction from their paycheck 
prior to taxation.  See § 401(k) of the Internal Revenue Code, authorizing tax deferral for an 
employee’s contribution to a plan meeting a nondiscrimination test.  26 U.S.C. § 401(k) (2012).  
As of 2017, the maximum pre-tax contribution is $18,000.  IRS Announces 2017 Pension Plan 
Limitations; 401(k) Contribution Limit Remains Unchanges at $18,000 for 2017, IRS (Oct. 27, 
2016), https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/irs-announces-2017-pension-plan-limitations-401k-
contribution-limit-remains-unchanged-at-18000-for-2017.  403(b) plans are available to employees 
of certain tax exempt institutions such as public schools.  Avci et al., supra note 2, at 348. 
 159. Id. at 349, 383 (“A recent Government Accountability Office (GAO) study has found that 
there are more than 300 taxpayers who own IRA accounts with an aggregate value of about $81 
billion.  Thus, the average balance in these accounts is over $250 million each.”). 
 160. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2012). 
 161. Gobeille v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 136 S. Ct. 936, 950 (2016) (Breyer J., concurring) 
(citing Egelhoff v. Egelhoff ex rel. Breiner, 532 U.S. 141, 148 (2001)). 
 162. 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(1). 
 163. Id. § 1003(b)(2). 
 164. 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-3(b)–(c) (2017). 
 165. 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1). 
 166. Id. § 1102(b)(4).  All plans must comply with the Plan Terms Benefit Mandate.  29 U.S.C. 
§ 1104(a)(1)(D).  See also Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 147 (holding a core feature of ERISA is the Plan 
Terms Benefit Mandate). 
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early in employment,167 and there is a spendthrift provision forbidding 
assignment or alienation of benefits before payments stipulated by the plan.168 
“At the end of 2015, U.S. defined contribution plan assets alone totaled $6.7 
trillion,”169 rising from $104 billion in 1978.170  Federal involvement in these 
plans is extensive too.  For the period 2014 through 2018, the estimated foregone 
federal tax revenue resulting from these plans is $785.1 billion for health and 
long-term care insurance plans, and an additional $700 billion for pension 
plans.171  On a personal level but with national implications, ERISA prompted 
increased savings for retirement when, “[u]nless the retirement savings and 
investments were managed competently, most Americans could end up in their 
old age with little savings and at the mercy of various social safety net programs, 
such as Social Security or Medicaid, which are only meant to be supplementary 
retirement vehicles.”172 
Nonetheless, increasing participation by employees does not guarantee 
investments will provide for maximum return, or even that they will match 
market returns.  Data suggests that “[r]eturns from insider trades of pension 
funds in which conflict of interest are likely to be present underperform the 
market by more than 5.5% over a year.”173  In a comparison with defined-benefit 
plans, which preceded ERISA defined-contribution plans, three commentators 
from the University of Michigan School of Business document that: 
Evidence shows that defined benefit plans significantly outperform 
defined contribution plans.  By design, defined benefit plans handle 
inflation risk by computing benefits as a fraction of the beneficiaries’ 
salaries during the last few years of their working years.  In contrast, 
in defined contribution plans the employees are expected to make 
financial decisions that help protect against inflation risk.  In one 
study, defined benefit plans outperformed defined contribution plans 
by 76 basis points annually between 1995 and 2011.  Another study 
found that defined benefit plans outperformed defined contribution 
plans during 1990-2012 by about 70 points annually.  Given that there 
was over $6.7 trillion invested in defined contribution plan accounts 
alone in 2015, underperformance of 70 basis points implies a cost of 
                                                 
 167. 29 U.S.C. § 1054.  An employee’s benefits may not be forfeited because of any company 
policy.  See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1053, 1081–86. 
 168. Id. §§ 1053(a)(E), 1104(a)(1)(D). 
 169. Avci et al., supra note 2, at 339 (citing 2016 Investment Company Fact Book, INV. CO. 
INST. 136 (2016), https://www.ici.org/pdf/2016_factbook.pdf.) 
 170. Id. at 349. 
 171. Colleen E. Medill, Regulating ERISA Fiduciary Outsourcing, 102 IOWA L. REV. 505, 511 
(2017) (citing Estimates of Federal Tax Expenditures for Fiscal Years 2014–2018, JOINT COMM. 
ON TAX’N 31–32 (Aug. 5, 2014), https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=466 
3.) 
 172. Avci et al., supra note 2, at 348. 
 173. Id. at 343. 
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about $50 billion per year. Once again, the lagging performance of the 
defined contribution plan adds an additional burden on the American 
worker to increase her future contributions as well as to take higher 
levels of risk.174 
The forms offered to employees by plan managers at the start of employment 
vary among employers.  The form is of particular significance to any discussion 
of federal preemption because of ERISA’s prohibition on accountholders 
changing a beneficiary designation in any manner other than through the 
accountholder executing a change in beneficiary form.175  The forms are 
typically prepared with little assistance from professionals chosen by the 
employee and are almost always executed at the start of a new job when the 
employee is young, many years away from retirement, death, birth of a child, or 
divorce.176  One author describes the usual process of executing the forms: 
Imagine reporting for your first day of work at a new job.  You sit 
down with the company’s human resources manager to complete a 
two-inch-tall stack of paperwork.  After 30 minutes, you reach the 
bottom of the stack, which consists of a packet labeled “Your 
Benefits.”  The human resources manager stands up and says, 
“Congratulations, you are now officially employed here.  I’ll show you 
to your office.”  Surprised, you respond, “But wait, aren’t we going to 
go through my company benefits?”  “No,” responds the human 
resources manager, “the company takes no responsibility whatsoever 
for your retirement and healthcare benefits.  You’ll have to call the 
800 number inside the packet and they will assist you.177 
Another author notes: 
The formalities necessary to execute a will are designed in part to 
ensure that the testator appreciates the gravity of the decisions he or 
she is making.  By contrast, the circumstances surrounding execution 
of [plan] beneficiary designation forms for establishing retirement 
accounts make it likely that the accountholder will not focus on the 
importance of the designations.178 
Indeed, “beneficiary designation forms financial institutions provide for 
distribution of non-probate assets are often designed not to ensure effectuation 
of decedent intent, but rather to minimize inconvenience for the financial 
institution.”179  Since plan managers owe a fiduciary duty to participants and 
beneficiaries under ERISA plans, failure to provide the employee with similar 
                                                 
 174. Id. at 351–52 (citations omitted). 
 175. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1055(a), 1056(d)(3)(A) (2012).  ERISA provides for two plan 
beneficiary designations.  Id. 
 176. See Sterk & Leslie, supra note 2, at 177, 210. 
 177. Medill, supra note 171, at 507. 
 178. Sterk & Leslie, supra note 2, at 211. 
 179. Leslie & Sterk, supra note 40, at 64. 
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formalities associated with execution of a last will and testament is a breach of 
fiduciary duty prompting redress under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)’s guarantee of 
appropriate equitable relief. 
Pension and welfare benefits comprise a substantial portion of an employee’s 
estate. ERISA plans track certain characteristics.  First, the plans offer attractive 
savings vehicles because there are tax benefits, they are easily entered into, and 
they are portable in this mobile workforce.  Commentators studying the 
formation of plans, conclude that an “accountholder does not open [an] account 
with succession rights in mind.  Instead, the accountholder opens the account to 
obtain tax deferral on savings for retirement—savings most accountholders 
expect to use, not to pass on to successors.”180  Second, the employer chooses a 
plan administrator to invest the funds and the employee may contribute or, as an 
alternative, with an IRA, the employee chooses his or her own plan custodian.  
Third, there is a contract signed by an employee, which designates a beneficiary, 
with a default beneficiary provided explicitly, or in the plan documents.  ERISA 
provides that when an accountholder dies, his or her surviving spouse will 
receive proceeds from the account unless the spouse waived that right.181  But 
note that a “plan participant may designate a beneficiary or beneficiaries who 
will receive the account proceeds if the plan participant dies before distribution 
of the account.”182 
Any designated beneficiary is subject to the claims of an accountholder’s 
spouse.183  ERISA requires compliance with a very specific procedure to waive 
a spouse’s statutory rights: the spouse’s waiver must be made after marriage, in 
a writing that names an alternate beneficiary and that is executed in front of a 
plan representative or notary public.184  Going forward, the spouse must consent 
to any change of beneficiary designation.185  By definition, prenuptial 
agreements fail to meet these exacting requirements: They are executed before 
marriage, and thus do not divest a spouse of statutory survivorship rights.186  “In 
                                                 
 180. Sterk & Leslie, supra note 2, at 209. 
 181. 26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(11)(A)(ii) (2006).  QDROs provide an exception.  See id. § 
401(a)(13)(C).  In addition, ERISA stipulates that waiver by a spouse must meet the requirements 
of 26 U.S.C. § 417(a)(2)(A) that: 
(i) the spouse of the participant consents in writing to such election, 
(ii) such election designates a beneficiary (or a form of benefits) which may not be 
changed without spousal consent (or the consent of the spouse expressly permits 
designations by the participant without any requirement of further consent by the spouse), 
and 
(iii)  the spouse’s consent acknowledges the effect of such election and is witnessed by a 
plan representative or a notary public[.] 
26 U.S.C. § 417(a)(2)(A)(i)–(iii). 
 182. Sterk & Leslie, supra note 2, at 173. 
 183. See 29 U.S.C. § 1055 (2012). 
 184. See 29 U.S.C. § 1055(c)(2)(A)(i)–(iii). 
 185. Id. 
 186. See Leslie & Sterk, supra note 40, at 87–88. 
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addition, couples may have difficulty complying with ERISA’s exacting timing 
requirements.”187 
“[M]any of the 401(k) forms are worded so as to actively encourage the 
accountholder to write in his or her spouse’s name.”188  ERISA does require the 
plan manager to provide the accountholder with a written explanation of the 
financial implications of the benefit options, including the various options 
provided to a spouse, within a specific period of time.189  A plan participant may 
not modify or terminate his or her spouse’s rights unilaterally, but the spouse 
may execute a waiver if it is done after the marriage, in the presence of a notary 
or plan representative, and an alternative beneficiary must be named.190  The 
effective means by which this may occur is through a QDRO, most often 
executed as part of a divorce financial settlement.  ERISA specifically provides 
that an accountholder may designate a participant’s spouse, former spouse, 
children, or other dependents with survivor benefits and other plan benefits by 
means of QDROs.191  There are cases when the accountholder sought to change 
the designated beneficiary through a valid last will and testament, but such 
attempts were held to violate ERISA’s plan designated beneficiary rule and 
hence are unenforceable.192  Likewise, prenuptial agreements, no matter how 
well-worded, cannot serve as a valid waiver of ERISA’s benefits owed to a 
spouse.193  Additionally, ERISA plans may not be altered by provisions in a 
divorce decree that attempt to modify the designated beneficiary’s right to 
receive proceeds under the plan,194 the one exception being a QDRO.195  There 
are a number of requirements associated with QDROs, failing to match the 
                                                 
 187. See id. at 72 n.57; see also Greenebaum & McDonald PLLC v. Sandler, 256 F. Appx 765, 
767 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding there is little support for a prenuptial agreement’s ability to satisfy 
ERISA’s spousal consent requirement); Robins v. Geisel, 666 F. Supp. 2d 463, 467 (D.N.J. 2009) 
(prenuptial agreement did not waive spouse’s right to her husband’s pension fund). 
 188. Sterk & Leslie, supra note 2, at 187. 
 189. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1025, 1053(e); I.R.C. § 411(a)(11) (2014); 26 C.F.R. § 1.411(a)(11) 
(2017). 
 190. See 29 U.S.C. § 1055(b)(1), (c)(1)–(2). 
 191. See id. § 1056(d)(3)(A).  Note the domestic relations order (DRO) does not require 
marriage, only that the accountholder’s companion was a dependent of the accountholder.  See id. 
§ 1056(d)(3)(B)(ii); Owens v. Auto. Machinists Pension Tr., 551 F.3d 1138, 1146–47 (9th Cir. 
2012) (holding a non-marital companion for thirty years was entitled to fifty percent of annuity 
benefits the accountholder was receiving from an ERISA pension plan). 
 192. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Plan Adm’r for DuPont Sav. & Inv. Plan, 555 U.S. 285, 300 (2009) 
(holding the plan’s documents must be changed or it would otherwise jeopardize plan 
administration efficiency). 
 193. See, e.g., Robins v. Geisel, 666 F. Supp. 2d 463, 467 (D.N.J. 2009); Greenebaum Doll & 
McDonald PLLC v. Sandler, 256 F. App’x 765, 768–69 (6th Cir. 2007); Hagwood v. Newton, 282 
F.3d 285, 292 (4th Cir. 2002); Nat’l Auto. Dealers & Assocs. Ret. Trust v. Arbeitman, 89 F.3d 496, 
502 (8th Cir. 1996). 
 194. See Kennedy, 555 U.S. at 300 (holding plan documents control distribution of funds). 
 195. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(B)(ii) (defining a QDRO as a judgement, decree, or order that 
relates to the provision of child support, alimony payments, or marital property rights to a spouse, 
former spouse, child, or other dependent of a participant). 
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requirements exactly, results in an ineffective transfer of beneficiary status from 
a spouse to a third party.196 
B. ERISA Preemption 
To date, all controlling judicial decisions hold that the “Plan Terms Benefit 
Mandate” controls the disposition of ERISA funds, specifying that the mandate 
provided by the terms of the accountholder’s contract designation form cannot 
be superseded by state rules of construction.197  Among these state rules are 
community property rights, antilapse provisions, substitute gift rules, and most 
often the subject of litigation, state statutes providing for revocation by operation 
of law upon divorce.  State statutes and rules of construction are preempted by 
force of ERISA and the United States Constitution.198 
Federal preemption of state laws is not automatic.  Over the years, cases 
evolved to explain that preemption applies whenever Congress attempts to 
dominate any field of law, or when there is a direct conflict between federal and 
state law.199  For example, field preemption applies if courts find there is a state 
reference to ERISA or that the state statute acts directly upon the ERISA plan.200  
                                                 
 196. See, e.g., Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Leich-Brannan, 812 F. Supp. 2d 729, 737 (E.D. Va. 2011) 
(holding the divorce decree was an ineffective QDRO because the decree lacked sufficient clarity). 
 197. See, e.g., Gobeille v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 136 S. Ct. 936, 943 (2016) (holding the 
need for workable standards led the Court to reject uncritical literalism in applying ERISA’s 
preemption clause); Hillman v. Maretta, 133 S. Ct. 1943, 1949 (2013) (holding that state laws which 
stand as obstacles to the execution of Congress’s full purpose and objective are preempted); 
Egelhoff v. Egelhoff ex rel. Breiner, 532 U.S. 141, 150 (2001) (holding that the state statute 
providing for revocation upon divorce was explicitly preempted by ERISA); Boggs v. Boggs, 520 
U.S. 833, 844 (1997) (holding the designated surviving spouse must take the proceeds and that 
states cannot freely change ERISA’s structure to balance individual state laws); Ridgway v. 
Ridgway, 454 U.S. 46, 63 (1981) (holding a soldier’s second wife, the designated beneficiary of 
the soldier’s life insurance, was entitled to the proceeds because of federal preemption and due to 
the Servicemen’s Group Life Insurance Act of 1955); Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 666 (1962) 
(holding state law must always yield when in conflict with federal law); Wissner v. Wissner, 338 
U.S. 655, 658 (1950) (holding “Congress has spoken with force and clarity in directing that the 
proceeds belong to the named beneficiary and no other.”). 
 198. An extensive coverage of federal preemption is beyond the scope of this Article; however, 
for conflict preemption, consult Gobeille, Hillman, and Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.  Gobeille, 
136 S. Ct. at 946–50; Hillman, 133 S. Ct. at 1949–50; Egelhoff, 532 at 147–50; Rice v. Santa Fe 
Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 229–38 (1947) (holding that a federal statute regulating grain 
storehouses preempted similar state regulations because Congress manifested its intention to 
preempt state laws that would result in dueling regulations of grain storehouses). 
 199. See David M. Frankford & Sara Rosenbaum, Teaching Health Law: A Survivalist Guide 
to Teaching ERISA, 61 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 495, 499–504 (2017). 
 200. Gobeille, 136 S. Ct. at 943; see also 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a), (c)(1) (defining state laws as 
any “laws, decisions, rules, regulation, or other State action having the effect of law, of any state.”); 
see also Preemption—ERISA Preemption—Sixth Circuit Holds That ERISA Does Not Preempt 
Michigan Medicaid Tax Law—Self-Insurance Institute of America, Inc. v. Snyder, 827 F.3d 549 
(6th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, No. 16-593, 2017 WL 69264 (U.S. Jan. 9, 2017), 130 HARV. L. REV. 
1512, 1515 (2017) (stating Gobeille brought a more stringent approach to federal preemption of 
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Preemption also applies if any state law presents an “impermissible connection” 
with an ERISA plan.201  Congress excluded from federal preemption, two types 
of state laws, thus permitting them to operate independently of congressional 
action: state laws regulating insurance and banking202 and state laws enacted to 
control criminal activity.203  There remains a nebulous area of state law that 
federal courts remain willing to utilize even though application contradicts the 
plan designated beneficiary mandate embraced by all major decisions applying 
federal preemption.  For example, even though there is no explicit reference to 
barring “slayers” from taking proceeds under ERISA policies, the “slayers 
statutes . . . always award the proceeds to someone other than the slayer”204 and 
this beneficiary-change is applied consistently.  To date, no federal court 
specifically addresses whether the slayer statutes are preempted by ERISA, thus 
permitting the possibility of an award of benefits to a slayer,205 but in fact no 
slayer received ERISA proceeds.  Some courts make mention of federal common 
law as the basis for utilizing the state slayer statutes,206 but there remains 
uncertainty. 
To illustrate the uncertainty over slayer statutes, both the 1981 decision of 
Ridgway v. Ridgway and the 2001 decision of Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, declined to 
draw any inferences from slayer statutes and their utilization to override the 
proceeds being paid to a designated beneficiary who was adjudicated a 
murderer.207  Any implications from the use of slayer statutes to modify ERISA 
plan designated beneficiaries is premature.  Comparing the issue with taxation 
issues, Professor Adam J. Hirsch suggests that a comparison be made with tax 
law involving disclaimers.  Both issues involve time, evolution, uncertainty, and 
hence federal common law is a poor basis for concluding that slayers statutes 
modify ERISA’s terms. 
                                                 
state policies); Joseph E. Zeis, Jr., Field Preemption and the Presumption of Federal Action: A 
Three-Way Supremacy Clause Tug of War, 41 U. DAYTON L. REV. 157, 178–79 (2016). 
 201. Gobeille, 136 S. Ct. at 943; see also 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (providing that ERISA 
“supersedes any and all state laws insofar as they may . . . relate to any [ERISA] plan”). 
 202. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2). 
 203. Id. § 1144(b)(4). 
 204. Langbein, supra note 5, at 1689 (suggesting that because slayer cases are virtually 
indistinguishable from state domestic relations statutes, there should be no preemption of them 
either); see also Kennedy v. Plan Adm’r for DuPont Sav. & Inv. Plan, 555 U.S. 285, 304 n.14 
(2009); Egelhoff v. Egelhoff ex rel. Breiner, 532 U.S. 141, 152 (2001); Nale v. Ford Motor Co. 
UAW Ret. Plan, 703 F. Supp. 2d 714, 722 (E.D. Mich. 2010).  The Eight Circuit applied the 
Arkansas state slayer statute explicitly in First National Bank & Trust Co. of Mountain Home v. 
Stonebridge Life Insurance Co., 9 F.3d 951, 955 (8th Cir. 2010). 
 205. Langbein, supra note 5, at 1692.  “The slayer rule is codified in the Restatements of 
Property and Restitution, and in the Uniform Probate Code.”  Id. at 1688. 
 206. See, e.g., Singer v. Black & Decker Corp., 964 F.2d 1449, 1453 (4th Cir. 1992) (holding 
federal common law should be used to further ERISA’s goals).  But see Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 
508 U.S. 248, 259 (1993) (holding federal common law is not authorized to revise ERISA’s text). 
 207. See Ridgway v. Ridgway, 454 U.S. 46, 60 n. 9 (1981); Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 152. 
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Doubtless, the federal statute governing the validity of disclaimers for 
tax purposes, as elaborated by federal regulations and case law, would 
prove influential.  But all of this would take time—quite a lot of time, 
in fact, if splits developed between circuits over what the federal 
common law should be.  In the meantime, plan administrators would 
face consolidated uncertainty . . . .  Courts have highlighted the value 
of certainty in connection with ERISA.208 
Arguably, the most common form of ERISA preemption involves QDROs, 
which offer the only form of modification of a plan-designated beneficiary 
because any other attempted change is preempted.209  Upon the death of the 
spouse of an accountholder, that spouse retains no community property right to 
any pension funds earned by the accountholder.210  Death is not the same as 
divorce.  As a result of ERISA and REA, if an accountholder divorces his or her 
spouse, then the federal statutes protect the rights of designate spouses, former 
spouses, children and dependents of participants as beneficiaries of that pension 
plan in accordance with any state domestic relations order that met standards 
outlined in the QDRO.211  Nonetheless, any state domestic relations order that 
does not meet the qualifications of a QDRO, and seeks to designate other 
beneficiaries, is preempted and subject to anti-assignment prohibition.212  To 
qualify as a QDRO the following are required: (1) a valid state domestic relations 
order was issued; (2) the order clearly specified the plan, the beneficiaries, the 
particular benefits; (3) the order was consistent with the pension plan’s terms; 
(4) there was no increase in the plan’s actuarial costs; (5) payments may be made 
even if the accountholder is not collecting benefits; and (6) former spouses may 
be treated as spouses under defined circumstances.213  Once the QDRO is filed 
correctly, the order must explicitly inform the accountholder of the pension 
benefits the accountholder will lose, the alternate taker must be identified 
                                                 
 208. Hirsch, supra note 42, at 1905–06 (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted); see also 
Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753, 765 (1992); Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat. Pension Fund, 
493 U.S. 365, 376–77 (1990). 
 209. See Feuer, supra note 153, at 953–54 (“[T]he QDRO exclusion from the ERISA Explicit 
Exemption appears to have only one purpose: to emphasize that state court orders that purport to 
assign or create rights to non-pension benefits (welfare benefits, such as garnishment orders or 
domestic relations orders pertaining to life insurance benefits) are preempted.”). 
 210. See Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 853–54 (1997) (holding that no community property 
interest in an accountholder’s pension passed upon the death of the accountholder’s spouse to any 
beneficiaries of that deceased spouse); see also Meghan A. Dupre, Comment, There Goes the 
Community: Federal Preemption of Marriage as the Demise of the State Community Property 
Regime, 90 TUL. L. REV. 185, 199–200 (2015). 
 211. See 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3) (2012); see generally GARY A. SHULMAN, THE QUALIFIED 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS ORDER HANDBOOK (3d ed. 2006); Employee Benefits Security 
Administration, QDROs: The Division of Retirement Benefits Through Qualified Domestic 
Relations Orders, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR (2014), https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/fil 
es/ebsa/about-ebsa/our-activities/resource-center/publications/qdros.pdf. 
 212. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(A). 
 213. See id. § 1056(d)(3)(B)–(F). 
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clearly, the number of payments specified, and amount of benefits allocated to 
each alternate taker.214 
Attorneys often fail to adequately advise clients as to the requirements for 
entering into a valid QDRO, as well as failing to assess the benefits accrued 
under ERISA pension plans when negotiating a divorce agreement between 
contesting parties.  As illustration, in one New York decision, a couple divorced 
and the attorney for the wife of the employee/accountholder filed a QDRO 
specifying that his client would receive a stipulated portion of the pension upon 
the accountholder’s retirement.215  Nothing was mentioned in the QDRO 
concerning the possibility of the accountholder’s death prior to retirement and 
nothing was mentioned in the divorce agreement that was, incorporated but not 
merged, into the divorce decree.  The accountholder died prior to retirement and 
it was discovered that the QDRO failed to stipulate that the former spouse was 
not to receive survivorship benefits, only retirement benefits.216  Based on these 
facts, the “plan administrator ultimately determined that because there was no 
QDRO naming plaintiff as the surviving spouse under the plan, she was 
ineligible under ERISA to receive preretirement death benefits.”217  After 
divorce, the former spouse was no longer a spouse eligible to receive benefits.218  
Furthermore, “only a QDRO can designate a former spouse to be a ‘surviving 
spouse’ for purposes of allocating benefits under ERISA.”219  “This exception 
to ERISA’s anti-assignment rule is not subject to judicial expansion.”220  In 
addition, the divorce judgement obtained by the attorney for the surviving 
former spouse, did not stipulate that she would receive survivorship benefits in 
the spouse’s pension upon the spouse’s death.221  This omission, coupled with 
the failure to provide for survivorship benefits under the QDRO, deprived the 
surviving spouse of any share in the accountholder’s pension retirement after his 
death.222  The court wrote: “[w]e therefore conclude that [the attorney’s] failure 
to include preretirement death benefits in either the stipulation or the judgment, 
and not his negligent failure to obtain a QDRO, was the cause of plaintiff’s 
injury.”223 
Accountholders who are married and covered under an ERISA pension plan 
must provide spouses with specified benefits if married for more than a year, not 
separated or abandoned by his or her spouse, or cannot locate his or her 
                                                 
 214. Id. § 1056(d)(3)(C).  While ERISA mandates disclosure to the accountholder, there is no 
concomitant requirement that disclosure be made to the accountholder’s spouse. 
 215. McCoy v. Fineman, 785 N.E.2d 714, 716–17 (N.Y. 2002). 
 216. Id. at 717. 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. at 720. 
 219. Id. at 720–21 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(F)). 
 220. Id. at 721. 
 221. McCoy v. Fineman, 785 N.E.2d 714, 721 (N.Y. 2002). 
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. 
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spouse.224  Note however, that benefits referenced as welfare benefits, life 
insurance, and disability payments are exempt from this requirement even 
though, they form part of ERISA protection.225  Additionally, certain other types 
of pension plans are exempt from the spousal protection requirement, permitting 
accountholders to withdraw or borrow from the plans without the consent of his 
or her spouse.  First, plans that are not characterized as 401(k) plans, or those 
with minimum funding rules.226  Second, plans that derive assets from sources 
such as a defined benefit plan.227  Lastly, whenever an accountholder chooses to 
receive the proceeds from the plan in the form of an annuity.228  Upon divorce, 
a spouse designated as such in any ERISA plan remains eligible to receive 
benefits as the plan’s designated beneficiary, either as a beneficiary of a welfare 
plan such as life insurance, or as the beneficiary of a pension plan.229  However, 
entitlement to notice and waiver prior to losing benefits is not a universal right 
guaranteed under all ERISA protected plans.230  Nonetheless, the Supreme Court 
holds that state revocation by operation of law statutes are irrelevant to all 
ERISA covered plans, thus preempting all state statutes that interfere with the 
designated Plan Terms Designated Mandate,231 regardless of spousal rights in 
those plans. 
C. ERISA Accommodation 
A properly constructed plan designated beneficiary form can accommodate 
the policy goals of ERISA, avoid the preemption issue, and better ascertain the 
evolving nature of an accountholder’s intent regarding distribution of plan 
assets.  Yet, there is scant evidence that plan managers are taking steps to 
accommodate the changing future circumstances of employees.  Professors Sterk 
and Leslie examined the beneficiary designation forms used by ten of the largest 
IRA providers in the United States and also examined a selection of firms 
                                                 
 224. 29 U.S.C. § 1055(c)(2)(B).  The plan manager may rely upon the assertion by the 
accountholder and is not liable as a result of the fiduciary relief statute.  Id. § 1055(c)(6).  Section 
1056(d)(3) makes reference to payments by QDRO.  See also Vilas v. Lyons, 702 F. Supp. 555, 
560–61 (D. Md. 1988) (holding fiduciaries are not obligated to look beyond the terms of the form 
that complies on its face).  But see Rice v. Rochester Laborers’ Annuity Fund, 888 F. Supp. 494, 
498–500 (W.D.N.Y. 1995) (holding a plan administrator cannot ignore clear warnings that an 
accountholder’s assertions are false). 
 225. 29 U.S.C. § 1051(1); see also Egelhoff v. Egelhoff ex rel. Breiner, 532 U.S. 141, 144–46 
(2001) (discussing a dispute between a surviving spouse and a former spouse who was named the 
beneficiary of the decedent’s life insurance policy, the Court found that the person to whom the 
decedent was married at the time of his death takes precedence if payment resulted from an ERISA 
pension plan). 
 226. 29 U.S.C. § 1055(b)(1)(B). 
 227. Id. § 1055(b)(1)(C)(iii). 
 228. Id. § 1055(b)(1)(C)(ii). 
 229. See Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 144–46. 
 230. See 28 U.S.C. § 1055(b)(1)(C), (c)(2). 
 231. See, e.g., Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 150 (holding divorce did not revoke the life insurance 
pension fund naming the former spouse as the designated beneficiary of those ERISA plans). 
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offering 401(k) plans.232  First, they conclude, the forms themselves provide few 
options for employees by which an accountholder might survey choices for 
beneficiaries or to anticipate future changes of status.233  Second, fewer than half 
of IRA providers suggest that plan participants consult with an attorney before, 
or after, commencing employment.234  Third, the forms “provide absolutely no 
notice” to the accountholder about exactly what would occur under the plan’s 
default distribution provision, that is, who would take in the event that the plan’s 
designated beneficiary does not take his or her share.235  Fourth: 
Seven of the ten 401(k) forms include no discussion of divorce at all.  
Of the remaining three, one indicates that divorce will not revoke the 
beneficiary designation, a second indicates that the designation will 
remain in effect even if “my marital status changes [unless I remarry],” 
and a third highlights the fact that a remarriage will revoke the 
designation without saying a word about the effect of divorce.236 
Lastly, while “[e]mpirical evidence is difficult to gather on this point . . . 
anecdotal evidence suggests that the accountholder will face a significant 
bureaucracy problem” if the accountholder creates his or her own designated 
beneficiary form, rather than choosing the one provided by the plan 
administrator.237  They conclude stating, “in any event, the lawyer will be in a 
better position than a client to persuade the account custodian to accept an 
alternative designation form.”238 
The solution to form inattentiveness advocated by Professors Sterk and Leslie 
is to develop a beneficiary designation form that an accountholder will 
understand and be able to complete in a manner reflecting his or her present and 
future intent.239  To illustrate, wills, intestacy, and nonprobate transfers, 
unencumbered by ERISA preemption, incorporate state rules of construction, 
making it easier to accommodate a person’s changing intent.240  Among these 
rules of construction, are provisions accommodating antilapse, substitute gift, 
revocation by operation of law, slayer statutes, constructive trusts, and an 
elective share mechanism for a surviving spouse.241  These professors suggest 
that an approach which guides an accountholder through choices while 
completing ERISA forms provided by employers is superior; going so far as to 
                                                 
 232. See Sterk & Leslie, supra note 2, at 201. 
 233. Id. at 202. 
 234. Id. 
 235. Id. at 203. 
 236. Id. at 203–04. 
 237. Sterk & Leslie, supra note 2, at 208–09. 
 238. Id. at 211–12 
 239. Id. at 215.  The form would “mandate a statutory default designation and prominent 
disclosure of that designation to the accountholder.”  Id.   The authors provide a model form as an 
appendix.  Id. at 231. 
 240. Id. at 207–08. 
 241. Sterk & Leslie, supra note 2, at 207–08. 
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state rules of construction, which are often unknown to employees.242  In 
addition, state rules only guess at what the accountholder intended, they 
“represent both an incomplete approach to confusing forms and an approach that 
threatens to distort the intent of many accountholders . . . .”243 
Professors Sterk and Leslie propose a beneficiary designation form that 
incorporates the following: First, the form should incorporate rules of 
construction applicable to wills and nonprobate transfers, unless the 
accountholder specifically opts out of them.244  Second, the designated 
beneficiaries would be identified as a status person, for example, the person to 
whom I am married at the time of my death, or, in the alternative, to my issue.245  
“These designation are more likely to account for changes in the accountholder’s 
life circumstances and therefore more likely to effectuate the accountholder’s 
intent.”246  Third, the form should contain an explicit warning, consistent with 
ERISA preemption, that any will or other instrument executed by the 
accountholder, in the past or in the future, does not revoke or revise the plan’s 
beneficiary designated on the form.247  Fourth, the form should adequately 
advise the accountholder that he or she should consult an attorney prior to 
establishing an estate plan, which purportedly includes the assets passing under 
the designated beneficiary form under applicable state rules regarding 
augmented estate.248  Fifth, the form should allow the accountholder to provide 
an executor with the discretionary power to distribute the plan’s proceeds “in 
such amounts as [beneficiaries] would have received if the account balance had 
been included in the accountholder’s probate estate.”249  By providing an 
executor with what amounts to an inter vivos power of appointment, the conflict 
between federal preemption of state rules of construction and ERISA’s focus on 
the designated beneficiary form is avoided.  The argument for such a proposal 
is that it permits the plan’s designated beneficiary to stand as written, or it 
captures the amount into the accountholder’s estate, permitting the proceeds to 
pass in accordance with the state’s rules of construction, or in accordance with 
directions given to an executor.250  “Depending on which alternative appears to 
best effectuate the accountholder’s intentions to avoid delays in distribution, the 
form would require the executor to exercise the power within sixty days after 
receiving notice of the accountholder’s death.”251 
                                                 
 242. Id. at 213–14. 
 243. Id. at 215. 
 244. Id. at 220. 
 245. Id. at 220–21. 
 246. Sterk & Leslie, supra note 2, at 221. 
 247. Id. 
 248. Id. 
 249. Id. 
 250. Id. 
 251. Id. 
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By offering options on the designated form executed by the accountholder, 
the proposals made by Professors Sterk and Leslie shift the focus from the 
vagaries of multiple state law to the goal of ERISA itself, which imposes a 
fiduciary duty to enforce, “the documents and instruments governing the plan . 
. . .”252  ERISA specifies that payments be made to a beneficiary who is 
“designated by a participant, or by the terms of [the] plan . . . .”253  Since the 
form is the sole focus of attention when distributing assets governed by ERISA, 
it makes sense to focus on the form’s provisions254 and thus any “invalidating 
circumstances” becomes sufficiently clear so as to be administratively feasible 
within the confines of ERISA’s national objectives.255 
An illustration of the pivotal importance of a plan’s beneficiary designation 
form occurred in the case of Kennedy v. Plan Administrators for DuPont Savings 
& Investment Plan.256  The facts involved an employee covered under an ERISA 
pension plan who designated his then current wife as the designated plan 
beneficiary in accordance with the plan’s forms.257 He provided no alternate or 
contingent beneficiary if she disclaimed her interest.258  The 
employee/accountholder and his wife later divorced and as part of the financial 
settlement his former wife signed a divorce decree divesting her of any interest 
in any pension plan.259  After the divorce, the employee did not change his 
pension plan’s designated beneficiary form so that the former spouse remained 
the plan’s designated beneficiary at the time of his death.260  At the employee’s 
death, the decedent’s daughter was responsible for his estate and she sought to 
receive the pension funds of nearly $400,000 into the estate’s account, however, 
the employer, DuPont, instead paid the proceeds to the plan’s designated 
beneficiary, the former spouse, much to the consternation of the decedent’s 
daughter.261 
                                                 
 252. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(D) (2012); see also Egelhoff v. Egelhoff ex rel. Breiner, 532 U.S. 
141, 151 n.4 (2001); Langbein, supra note 5, at 1672–73. 
 253. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(8), 1104(a)(1)(D), 1056(d)(1) (providing that benefits under the 
plan may not be assigned or alienated); Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 151 (holding ERISA requires that 
plans be administered, and benefits paid, in accordance with plan documents and not be affected 
with conflicting state laws). 
 254. See, e.g., Bostic v. Bostic, No. 6:14-2130-BHH, 2015 WL 5178163, at *5 (D.S.C. Sept. 
3, 2015) (holding ERISA requires the plan’s form designated beneficiary to take proceeds from the 
plan). 
 255. See Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 155–56 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“In any event, in this case the 
plan documents explicitly foresee that a beneficiary designation may become ‘invalid,’ but they do 
not specify the invalidating circumstances”); see also Rosenbury, supra note 68, at 1852 (noting 
that Congress is implicitly interested “in ensuring that the insurance proceeds will be paid to the 
named beneficiary and that the beneficiary can use them”). 
 256. 555 U.S. 285 (2009). 
 257. Id. at 288. 
 258. Id. at 289. 
 259. Id. 
 260. Id. at 289–90. 
 261. Id. 
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Initially, the federal district court ruled in favor of the daughter and ordered 
the employer to pay the proceeds to her, rather than to the designated former 
spouse from whom the decedent was divorced at the time of his death.262  The 
district court based its ruling on the waiver signed by the former spouse at the 
time of divorce, following a decision from the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in 
2000.  The district court ruled that a beneficiary may waive his or her right to 
the proceeds from an ERISA plan if the waiver is “explicit, voluntary, and made 
in good faith.”263 The former spouse appealed, and the Fifth Circuit reversed the 
ruling of the district court, holding the waiver as ineffective to deprive the former 
spouse of her interest in the pension plan.264  The appellate court ruled that a 
QDRO was the exclusive means by which a divorcing spouse may waive ERISA 
benefits and that “mechanism [was] not invoked.”265  Eventually, the Supreme 
Court granted certiorari to resolve a split among the Courts of Appeals and the 
various state courts over “a divorced spouse’s ability to waive pension plan 
benefits through a divorce decree not amounting to a QDRO.”266  In addition to 
the specific issue raised, the facts gave the Court an opportunity to revisit the 
issue of when it is possible for a beneficiary to waive his or her interest arising 
from the plan documents.  In 2009, the Court held a divorce decree did not 
constitute a valid waiver under the terms of ERISA,267 instead the waiver by a 
beneficiary promotes uncertainty, something anathema to ERISA plan policy. 
The point is that by giving a plan participant a clear set of instructions 
for making his own instructions clear, ERISA forecloses any 
justification for enquiries into nice expressions of intent, in favor of 
the virtues of adhering to an uncomplicated rule: “simple 
administration, avoid[ing] double liability, and ensur[ing] that 
beneficiaries get what’s coming quickly, without folderol essential 
under less-certain rules.”268 
The simplicity of plan administration is often mentioned as one of the 
preeminent goals of ERISA,269 “[t]he congressional debates over ERISA suggest 
                                                 
 262. Id.; see also Manning v. Hayes, 212 F.3d 866, 874 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding a spouse may 
waive his or her spousal benefits under federal common law as long as the waiver is explicit, 
voluntary, and made in good faith). 
 263. Kennedy, 555 U.S. at 290 (quoting Manning, 212 F.3d at 874). 
 264. See Kennedy v. Plan Adm’r for DuPont Sav. & Inv. Plan, 497 F.3d 426, 431 (5th Cir. 
2007). 
 265. Kennedy, 555 U.S. at 290–91 (emphasis added) (quoting Kennedy, 497 F.3d at 431). 
 266. Id. 
 267. Id. at 297 (explaining that under 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1), her waiver was not a QDRO 
because it “did not constitute an assignment or alienation rendered void”). 
 268. Id. at 301 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (quoting Fox Valley & Vicinity Constr. Workers 
Pension Fund v. Brown, 897 F.2d 275, 283 (7th Cir. 1990)). 
 269. See, e.g., Singer v. Black & Decker Corp., 964 F.2d 1449, 1452 (4th Cir. 1992) (holding 
Congress wanted to ensure that plans and plan sponsors would be subject to a uniform body of 
benefit law, the goal being to minimize the administrative and financial burden of complying with 
conflicting directives). 
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that its preemption provisions stemmed from a related concern: achieving 
administrative efficiency.”270  Efficiency is the motivation underlying the 
Court’s adherence to the plan document rule mandating that the documents 
executed by the accountholder, alone, form the basis of payment to designated 
beneficiaries.  In 2010, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, citing Justice 
Souter’s 2009 decision in Kennedy, wrote, “plan administrators must ‘hew[ ] to 
the directives of the plan documents’ rather than ‘examin[ing] a multitude of 
external documents that might purport to affect the dispensation of benefits’ and 
becoming ‘drawn into litigation like this over the meaning and enforceability of 
waivers.”271  Likewise, when preempting a state law mandating disclosure of 
medical records, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals explained that “one of 
ERISA’s core functions . . . [cannot] be laden with burdens, subject to 
incompatible, multiple and variable demands, and freighted with risk of fines, 
breach of duty, and legal expense.”272 
Simplicity of administration of ERISA benefits is a consistent theme 
throughout all the major decisions enforcing ERISA preemption of state laws 
and private settlement agreements.  In 2001, Justice Thomas wrote that 
mastering the laws of fifty states would “undermine the congressional goal of 
‘minimiz[ing] the administrative and financial burden[s]’ on plan 
administrators—burdens ultimately borne by the beneficiaries.”273  In 2013, 
Justice Sotomayor, discussing the preemption by FEGLIA, held the Act 
preempted a state statute that reassigned proceeds to be paid to a designated 
beneficiary.274  FEGLIA, which provides low-cost group life insurance to federal 
employees,275 is meant to provide a simple plan of payment to a designated 
beneficiary, “[r]ather than draw an inference about an employee’s probable 
intent from a range of sources, Congress established a clear and predictable 
procedure for an employee to indicate who the intended beneficiary of his life 
insurance shall be.”276  Simplicity of administration is implied as essential.277  
                                                 
 270. Hirsch, supra note 42, at 1903. 
 271. Carmona v. Carmona, 603 F.3d 1041, 1047 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 272. Gobeille v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 136 S. Ct. 936, 942 (2016) (citing Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. 
v. Donegan, 746 F.3d 497, 510 (2d Cir. 2014)); State Farm Life & Accident Assurance Co. v. 
Goecks, 184 F. Supp. 3d 701, 708–09 (W.D. Wis. 2016) (holding a constructive trust could not be 
imposed on proceeds paid to a designated beneficiary, opining that “[i]f permitted, this could 
potentially expose not just beneficiaries, but employers and administrators to the nuances of 50 
state laws, rather than federal law governing ERISA, contrary both to the Supreme Court’s Egelhoff 
and the Seventh Circuit’s Melton decisions”). 
 273. Egelhoff v. Egelhoff ex rel. Breiner, 532 U.S. 141, 149–50 (2001) (quoting Ingersoll-
Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 142 (1990)). 
 274. Hillman v. Maretta, 133 S. Ct. 1943, 1949 (2013).  But see Gobeille, 136 S. Ct. at 950 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (writing that a state’s efforts to track health care services and “the cost of 
those services do not impermissible intrude on ERISA’s dominion over employee benefit plans[]”). 
 275. Federal Employees’ Group Life Insurance Act of 1954 (FEGLIA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 8701–
8716 (2012). 
 276. Hillman, 133 S. Ct. at 1952. 
 277. See id. at 1953. 
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Finally, in 2016, Justice Kennedy joined by a majority of the Court, held ERISA 
preempted a Vermont statute that required all health insurance providers to file 
reports with the state containing claims data.278  The Court concluded that 
ERISA preempted the state reporting requirement so as to prevent the “States 
from imposing novel, inconsistent, and burdensome reporting requirements on 
plans.”279 
Ease of administration is essential to the administration of ERISA, FEGLIA, 
NSLIA, and SGLIA benefits and this may be accommodated in any 
comprehensive revision of a plan’s designated beneficiary form.  Professors 
Sterk and Leslie advocate this approach, albeit with the admission that a revised 
form may require additional burdens, delay in receiving the proceeds, and state 
influence in implementing the form may be too onerous for federal goals.280  As 
to the additional burden of a redesigned form, it would admittedly require “the 
account custodian to locate the accountholder’s children, to figure out whether 
the accountholder died married, or to figure out whether any deceased child left 
surviving issue, would place a new and unwarranted burden on the custodian.”281  
The authors of the proposed form assess this burden as “insubstantial”282 and 
this seems logical in this age of computer generated searches.  Any delay in 
receipt of funds would not be excessive compared to receipt of funds associated 
with other nonprobate or probate transfers at death, “[w]hatever delays remain 
would be a small price to pay for effectuating the accountholder’s intent.”283  
Additionally, the authors suggest “a statute could dictate the procedures the 
custodian should follow and insulate the custodian from liability if he follows 
those procedures.”284 
All judicial decisions ruling in favor of ERISA preemption reference 
congressional intent to disengage from state law entanglements.285  Therefore, a 
revised designation form incorporating state rules of construction pertaining to 
                                                 
 278. Gobeille, 136 S. Ct. at 940. 
 279. Id. at 945. 
 280. Sterk & Leslie, supra note 2, at 222–24. 
 281. Id. at 222. 
 282. Id. 
 283. Id. at 223. 
 284. Id. 
 285. See, e.g., Gobeille v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 136 S. Ct. 936, 939 (2016) (“Pre-emption is 
necessary in order to prevent multiple jurisdictions from imposing differing, or even parallel, 
regulations, creating wasteful administrative costs and threatening to subject plans to wide-ranging 
liability.”); Hillman v. Maretta, 133 S. Ct. 1943, 1953 (2013) (“If States could make alternative 
distributions outside the clear procedure Congress established, that would transform this narrow 
exception into a general license for state law to override FEGLIA.”); Egelhoff v. Egelhoff ex rel. 
Breiner, 532 U.S. 141, 148 (2001) (“Uniformity is impossible . . . if plans are subject to different 
legal obligations in different States.”); Bostic v. Bostic, No. 6:14-2130-BHH, 2015 WL 5178163, 
at *5 (D.S.C. Sept. 3, 2015) (“Congress wanted ‘to ensure that plans and plan sponsors be subject 
to a uniform body of benefit law; the goal was to minimize the administrative and financial burden 
of complying with conflicting directives among States or between States and the Federal 
Government’”) (citing Singer v. Black & Decker Corp., 964 F.2d 1449, 1452 (4th Cir. 1992)). 
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wills and nonprobate transfers is not likely to significantly detract from federal 
policies of uniformity and efficiency.  It appears the authors conclude that 
“account custodians have a stake in the forms used, and an overwhelming 
interest in reducing administrative costs.”286  The forms themselves still control 
the distribution of the proceeds, any reference to state rules of construction 
reflects consensus and the likelihood that the designation reflects the 
accountholder’s wishes.287 
In addition to redesigning the form itself, Professors Sterk and Leslie suggest 
that accountholders be requested to complete periodic updates to their forms, 
perhaps once every five years.288  Updates facilitate identification of current 
beneficiaries and provide a more accurate gauge of the intent of the 
accountholder.289  An updated form is also likely to decrease the administrative 
burden of paying proceeds and accounting for named beneficiaries.290  It is 
further suggested accountholders be notified to always consult with an attorney 
when estate planning, “[i]f the designation form made accountholders aware that 
consultation with a lawyer would avoid delay at the time for distribution, more 
accountholders would likely seek advice before completing the forms.”291 
The development and implementation of enhanced plan beneficiary 
designation forms seems the appropriate vehicle by which to implement the 
intent of the accountholder, and hence administer the plan consistent with 
fiduciary duties.  Enhanced forms are administratively simple, making periodic 
inquiry of accountholders requesting updated forms seems logical, easy to 
facilitate, and is included within the administrator’s fiduciary responsibility.  
The lesson to learn from the litigation to date is that: “[n]o statutes or case law 
preclude use of a more effective beneficiary designation form.”292 
III.  PRUDENTLY ACCOMMODATING ERISA 
A. Appropriate Equitable Relief 
The terms of ERISA are enforced through exclusive federal jurisdiction.293  
Federal courts are tasked with ensuring that plan participants or beneficiaries 
may recover their benefits due under the plan or, alternatively, to enforce rights 
                                                 
 286. Sterk & Leslie, supra note 2, at 224. 
 287. Id. 
 288. Id. 
 289. Id. at 224–25. 
 290. Id. at 225. 
 291. Id. at 227. 
 292. Sterk & Leslie, supra note 2, at 227.  Professors Sterk and Leslie do not propose a 
standardized form, but suggest that there should be incentives to use an “approved” form, 
neglecting to specify if the incentives should arise because of federal or state legislation.  Id. 
 293. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a), (e)(1) (2012).  But a beneficiary may file a claim in state court for 
benefits provided under § 1132(a)(1)(B), but removal to federal court remains an option.  See, e.g., 
Bartholet v. Reishauer A.G., 953 F.2d 1073, 1075 (7th Cir. 1992). 
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to present or future benefits under the plan.294  When Congress enacted ERISA, 
it was with the purpose of rectifying the inadequacy of past pension plans.295  In 
1963, the automaker Studebaker, defaulted on its own pension plan created to 
benefit employees prior to ERISA, resulting in the loss of financial security for 
thousands of its’ current and retired workers.296  This loss prompted hearings 
and debate, culminating in ERISA’s passage in 1974.297  Congress sought to 
establish minimum standards of vesting, funding, and prudence to protect the 
security of pension benefits—ultimately covering a substantial portion of the 
American workforce.298  “Substantively, [ERISA] imposes a requirement of 
mandatory trusteeship on pension and employee benefit plans; it absorbs the 
core fiduciary duties of loyalty and prudence from trust law and extends them to 
govern all aspects of plan administration.”299  By imposing only the core 
fiduciary duties, the courts modified whatever else might develop as the field 
took shape.300  For example, courts fashioned remedies for “the duty to inform 
beneficiaries about significant aspects of trust administration; the duties to 
collect, segregate and earmark, and protect trust property; and the duties to 
enforce and defend claims.”301 
Undoubtedly, Congress intended to remove employee pension and welfare 
benefits from the management of corrupt individuals and organizations.  
Investigations by the Senate’s McClellan Committee, “led by its chief counsel, 
Robert F. Kennedy, found widespread looting of plan funds through sweetheart 
deals, kickback, and various forms of cronyism.”302  As a result, ERISA requires 
plan managers to follow written claims procedures, to give reasons for denials, 
and to provide an appellate procedure for any denial of benefits by “the 
appropriate named fiduciary” who is subject to ERISA’s duties of loyalty and 
                                                 
 294. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a); Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 148 (1985) 
(holding ERISA protects contractually assigned benefits). 
 295. LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 69, at 68–72. 
 296. For a description of a pre-ERISA plan’s default, look at Pension and Employee Benefit 
Law.  Id.; see also James A. Wooten, “The Most Glorious Story of Failure in the Business”: The 
Studebaker-Packard Corporation and the Origins of ERISA, 49 BUFF. L. REV. 683, 684 (2001). 
 297. H.R. REP. NO. 93-533, at 1 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4639; see also 
29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (2000); Michael S. Gordon, Overview: Why Was ERISA Enacted?, in U.S. 
SEN. SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING, 98TH CONG., THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY 
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 298. H.R. REP. NO. 93-533, at 1–2. 
 299. Langbein, supra note 1, at 1319.  Welfare plans administered by ERISA are also subject 
to fiduciary law, but these programs are excused from other substantive rules, such as vesting, anti-
reduction, and plan funding rules, and the plan termination programs that guarantees payment of 
other benefits.  Id. at 1323–24 (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 1051(1), 1081(a), 1102(a)(1)). 
 300. Id. at 1319–20. 
 301. Id. at 1326–27; Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 497 (1996) (holding trust law offers 
only a starting point whereby the courts will need to examine competing congressional purposes); 
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 111 (1989) (holding courts should be guided 
by principles of trust law in fashioning judicial review standards). 
 302. Langbein, supra note 1, at 1324 (footnotes omitted). 
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prudence.303  ERISA establishes monetary fines to be levied against any plan 
administrator who fails to provide requested information to a plan participant 
within thirty days after the receipt of a request.304 Therefore, Congress enacted 
ERISA so that if an employee is promised a pension benefit, the employee will 
actually receive it.305  Also, the policy goal is to ensure ERISA’s plan managers 
are held to a fiduciary standard of conduct that requires “adequate public 
disclosure of the plan’s administrative and financial affairs.”306 
ERISA provides for an expansive fiduciary definition.  There are fiduciaries 
specified by the plan itself, or fiduciary status can be anyone who exercises 
“discretionary control or authority” over the plan’s management, administration, 
or assets.307  Thus, companies or individuals are either named fiduciaries or the 
functional equivalent, each determined according to the plan documents or by 
exercising decision-making authority.308  However, even if a fiduciary 
permissibly delegates plan management to others, the designated fiduciary is 
presented with the duty to monitor the performance of the individuals or entity 
to whom delegation is given.309  The only restraint upon the status of fiduciary 
is “fiduciaries must be fiduciaries with respect to the particular activity at 
issue.”310 
The duty of prudence formulated under ERISA owed by fiduciaries is 
commensurate with trust law and yet the statute provides few details.  Professor 
Langbein argues the minimalist language in ERISA was intentional, meant to 
permit ERISA to draw upon the depth of trust law’s equity experience.311  
Professor Langbein criticizes the Court’s failure to recognize the depth and 
inclusiveness of, for example: ERISA’s loyalty and prudence norms, “as well as 
the intimate functional connection between those rules and the remedy 
provisions of ERISA . . . .”312  The consequence is that “the Court has been 
treating ordinary applications of traditional fiduciary and remedy law as 
                                                 
 303. 29 U.S.C. § 1133(2). 
 304. See id. § 1132(c) (cataloging penalties). 
 305. See Cent. States, Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Fund v. Cent. Transp., Inc., 472 U.S. 559, 571 
(1985); Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 375 (1980). 
 306. H.R. REP. NO. 93-533, at 17 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4655. 
 307. See Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 251 (1993); see also Harris Tr. & Sav. Bank 
v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 530 U.S. 238, 238 (2000) (“Section 502(a)(3)’s authorization to a 
plan ‘participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary’ to bring a civil action for ‘appropriate equitable relief” 
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Benefit Law.  LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 69, at 648–62. 
 308. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A); Finkel v. Romanowicz, 577 F.3d 79, 85–86 (2d Cir. 2009); 
STEPHEN J. KRASS, PENSION ANSWER BOOK Q 23:1 (2018). 
 309. Delegation authority is granted under 29 U.S.C. § 1103. 
 310. Fadely v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ga., Inc., No. 1:11-CV-1409-TWT, 2011 WL 
4974857, at *4 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 18, 2011) (citing Cotton v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 402 F.3d 1267, 
1277 (11th Cir. 2005)). 
 311. See Langbein, supra note 1, at 1363. 
 312. Id. at 1329. 
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impermissible extensions of the statute.”313  Instead, the Court should draw upon 
the rich tradition already in existence.314  Specifically, Professor Langbein 
suggests courts should not preempt remedies outside the specific text of ERISA, 
but instead should include preexisting remedies as part of the “equitable relief” 
specified in ERISA itself.315  Traditionally, when trustees breach their fiduciary 
duties, the law of trusts long exhibited a remedial system that “allows for 
recovery of loss, restitution of profits, and recovery of foregone gains.”316 
Nonetheless, Professor Langbein argues the Court fails to grasp the impact of 
ERISA’s equitable relief,317 criticizing a series of Supreme Court decisions, 
suggesting that the equitable relief promised in 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3), “should 
have been understood to include make-whole monetary relief for consequential 
injury as well as specific relief.”318 
Assuming Professor Langbein’s rationale is correct, what are the limits to the 
equitable relief granted in § 1132(a)(3)?  If ERISA’s procedures and remedies 
“suffer from major omissions that the courts have had to supply from context,” 
the argument that traditional trust law provides the “equitable relief” needed is 
bolstered.319  In other words, “[w]hen Congress uses . . . conceptual language, 
Congress necessarily intends for the courts to interpret it—to supply the 
specifics.”320  This is commensurate with the argument put forth by Professor 
Langbein that: 
Congress federalized the law of pension and benefit plan 
administration for the primary purpose of protecting plan participants 
and beneficiaries through a triple regime of mandatory trusteeship, 
extensive fiduciary duties, and commensurate remedies.  Those 
                                                 
 313. Id. 
 314. Id. at 1338. 
 315. Id. at 1332 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)).  Professor Langbein objects to Justice Scalia’s 
opinion in Mertens, which “construed ‘appropriate equitable relief’ in section [1132(a)(3)] to 
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of pre-fusion equity.”  Id. at 1364. 
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as “the workhorse of ERISA remedy law under which routine benefit denial and other ERISA 
claims proceed.”  Id. 
 317. Id. at 1335 (citing examples of the Court’s missed opportunity to utilize trust law to 
provide remedies, such as Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 216–17 
(2002); Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 260–62 (1993); Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. 
Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 148 (1985)). 
Characterizing the damages issue in such cases as contractual (in the sense of 
‘extracontractual’) rather than fiduciary further underscores the great failing in the 
Supreme Court’s handling of ERISA remedy issues in Russell, Mertens, and Great-West: 
the Court’s neglect of the trust law basis of ERISA remedy law in interpreting the 
authorizations for equitable relief in section 502(a). 
Id. at 1346. 
 318. Id. at 1338. 
 319. Id. at 1345. 
 320. Id. at 1363. 
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remedies, all derived from the make-whole tradition of the law of 
trusts, sound exclusively in equity and include money damages for 
consequential injury.321 
It follows that the law of trusts can view the failure to provide adequate plan 
forms and subsequent inquiry as breach of fiduciary responsibility, mandating 
that plan managers comply with the terms of the beneficiary mandate rule, 
compensating those victimized by the breach.  
B. Plan Managers 
Applying statutory provisions to current factual situations is the crux of legal 
practice. Thus, it is necessary to apply ERISA’s statutory civil action entitlement 
given to individuals to enforce benefits arising thereunder.  Logically, cases 
illustrate that plaintiffs must first exhaust administrative remedies under the 
ERISA plan before commencing action in courts.322  Once administrative 
remedies are exhausted, plaintiffs are free to petition the courts to redress 
grievances under either § 1132(a)(1)(B) to recover benefits due under the terms 
of the plan, or to clarify rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan.323  
That particular ERISA provision is not used to “reform” terms of the plan, but 
rather is only being used to enforce present and prospective rights under the 
terms as stated.324  Any change in plan terms, no matter how equitable the claim, 
should not be “inferred without evidence of a concomitant awareness of its 
gravity on the part of the Congress . . . .”325 
Section 1132(a)(3) permits a separate cause of action that arises under § 
1132(a)(1)(B).  Under § 1132(a)(3), a civil action may be brought by: 
[A] participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary (A) to enjoin any act or 
practice which violates any provision of this subchapter or the terms 
of the plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to 
redress such violations or (ii) to enforce any provision of this 
subchapter or the terms of the plan.326 
                                                 
 321. Id. at 1365–66.  The author criticizes Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court in Mertens, 
which restrained the monetary relief available through equity.  Id. at 1321. 
 322. See Park v. Tr. of 1199 SEIU Health Care Emps. Pension Fund, 418 F. Supp. 2d 343, 351, 
357 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
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*7 (S.D.N.Y. July 24, 2017). 
 326. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (2012); see, e.g., Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 
101, 119 (1989) (holding a participant includes a former employee where there is a reasonable 
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In one illustration, an employee, under a defined benefit plan, made 
contributions to her plan throughout her employment with the New York 
University Medical Center, from 1976 until her death in 1998.327  Allegedly, two 
years before her death, the employee contacted the pension fund manager in an 
attempt to change the beneficiary of her pension from her estranged husband to 
her two children, but the manager was allegedly unresponsive.328  
Representatives of the fund denied that the employee ever contacted them and 
further alleged that they employed staff to respond to employee telephone 
inquiries.329  Nonetheless, the employee died prior to retirement and her 
estranged husband remained the beneficiary of her pension fund, even though 
the two remained married, but were in fact separated.330 
An attorney representing the employee’s estate requested the pension fund 
proceeds, but the fund manager informed the pension funds are to be paid to the 
employee’s husband since he was the plan’s designated beneficiary.331  
Thereafter, the estranged husband purportedly waived his right to the pension, 
but he never contacted the fund manager, nor did he exhaust the fund’s 
administrative appeals process.332  The estate of the decedent filed suit against 
the fund because of the fund’s refusal to violate the plan’s designated beneficiary 
rule, alleging that the estate, not the estranged husband, is the rightful intended 
beneficiary of the fund proceeds.  The estate argues the terms of ERISA provide 
it with standing to pursue civil action,333 but the plan managers disagreed, 
asserting that ERISA defines a beneficiary as someone designated by a 
participant in the plan, or by the terms of the employee’s plan who is or may be 
entitled to a benefit under the plan.334  In addition to ERISA’s definition, the 
plan’s documents define a beneficiary as the “person or persons, including your 
spouse that you designate to receive payments from the Pension Fund after your 
death.”335  Despite the apparent definitional disparity, the estate argued it is a 
bona fide beneficiary under the terms of the plan because it could become a 
beneficiary in the future and that this is sufficient to provide standing.336 
                                                 
expectation of returning to covered employment or where there is colorable claim to vested 
benefits). 
 327. Park, 418 F. Supp. 2d at 348. 
 328. Id. at 349.  An affidavit was submitted from a co-worker of the employee which alleged 
the employee called the number in the pension plan booklet but no one returned her call.  Id. 
 329. Id. 
 330. Id. 
 331. Id. 
 332. Park, 418 F. Supp. 2d at 349. 
 333. Id. at 350 (“Section 1132(a)(1) authorizes suits by a ‘participant or beneficiary,’ Section 
1132(a)(3) authorizes suits by a ‘participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary,’ and Section 1132(g)(1) 
authorizes an award of attorney’s fees and costs in an action brought by a ‘participant, beneficiary, 
or fiduciary.’”). 
 334. Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1002(8)). 
 335. Id. 
 336. Id. 
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The district court disagreed with the estate’s interpretation of who constitutes 
a beneficiary able to bring suit under ERISA because the decedent employee 
died before retirement, still validly married, her spouse is the only person 
eligible to be designated as a beneficiary under her pension plan.337  The court 
reasoned: 
If [the employee] had submitted an application to receive her pension 
benefits before she died, as required for her to have been able to 
designate a beneficiary other than her spouse, she could have named a 
different beneficiary if she obtained spousal consent or a lost spouse 
waiver.  Because she did not perform either of these acts, the Estate is 
not and never was eligible to be designated a beneficiary of her 
benefits.338 
In defining who is a beneficiary permitted to bring suit, the court held, “mere 
possibility” that the estate could become the beneficiary is insufficient to 
establish standing under ERISA § 1132.339 
By refusing to recognize the “potential beneficiary” status for purposes of 
granting standing to the employee’s estate, the court relies upon a familiar policy 
expressed throughout many ERISA decisions: the plan’s designated beneficiary 
rule.340  In addition, the court references established judicial policy holding § 
1132(a)(3) strictly limits the plaintiffs who may bring certain civil actions,341 
and that “absent clear Congressional expression, the courts do not have 
jurisdiction over actions brought by non-enumerated parties.”342  Nonetheless, 
even though the court held the estate lacked standing to pursue its claims as a 
beneficiary, the court did discuss whether the employee was “likely prejudiced” 
because of unawareness to the spousal waiver provisions, the lost spouse 
exception to a spouse’s claim, or that the pension fund managers failed to 
respond to the employee.343  In dicta the court recognizes the value of equitable 
considerations in the processing of ERISA claims.  Hence, one interpretation is 
                                                 
 337. Id. at 351. 
 338. Park, 418 F. Supp. 2d at 351. 
 339. Id. (citing Coleman v. Champion Int’l Corp., 992 F.2d 530, 533 n.6 (5th Cir. 1993), in 
which “a pension plan participant’s son not designated a beneficiary lacked standing to maintain 
an ERISA action in both his individual capacity and his capacity as the representative of the 
deceased participant’s estate”). 
 340. See, e.g., Hillman v. Maretta, 133 S. Ct. 1943, 1948 (2013) (holding the designated 
beneficiary form takes precedence unless defined exceptions are followed); Egelhoff v. Egelhoff 
ex rel. Breiner, 532 U.S. 141, 147 (2001) (holding the fiduciary shall administer the plan in 
accordance with the documents and instruments governing the plan). 
 341. Park, 418 F. Supp. 2d at 351 (citing Harris Trust & Sav. Bank v. Salomon Smith Barney, 
Inc., 530 U.S. 238, 247 (2000)). 
 342. Id. at 352 (citing Pressroom Unions-Printers League Income Sec. Fund v. Cont’l 
Assurance Co., 700 F.2d 889, 892 (2d Cir. 1983)); see also American Psychiatric Ass’n v. Anthem 
Health Plans, Inc., 821 F.3d 352, 361 (2d Cir. 2016) (holding a group of physicians lacked standing 
to sue under ERISA on behalf of their patients). 
 343. See Park, 418 F. Supp. 2d at 352–57. 
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that the plan manager’s failure to adequately provide information and inquiry to 
an employee under the plan resulted in the unjust enrichment of the plan’s 
designated beneficiary, justifying a claim by the estate of the employee for 
restitution.  Was it sufficient that the employee was given a summary plan 
description, as required by federal regulations, when she commenced 
employment?344  Did the plan managers make inquiry of the employee 
throughout her employment?  Admittedly, neither the employee’s estranged 
husband, nor the decedent’s estate, exhausted the administrative remedies 
available under the pension plan.345  Instead, the estate, with the assistance of 
the estranged husband, immediately sought a judicial remedy, a remedy only 
permitted once all administrative remedies are exhausted.346  The court implies 
that equity aids the vigilant and that administrative remedies must be exhausted 
or plaintiff must prove clearly and convincingly that such a pursuit is futile.347  
Otherwise, “plaintiff is seeking a heartier bite at the apple in federal court—one 
with more teeth.”348 
Do equitable claims require exhaustion of administrative remedies?  Despite 
the holding in Park v. Trustees of 1199 Seiu Health Care Employees Pension 
Fund that under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) any plaintiff must exhaust 
administrative remedies unless excused because of futility, the court concedes 
that “the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has not yet addressed whether 
these procedures are required for claims under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) for 
alleged breach of fiduciary duty.”349  Section 1132(a)(3) provides that a civil 
action may be brought, in part, to “obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to 
redress such violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of this subchapter or the 
terms of the plan[.]”350  Also, the court in Shamoun v. Board of Trustees, cites 
to a Second Circuit decision, holding there is no exhaustion requirement for 
ERISA statutory claims that do not arise under the plan’s policy, for example, 
an employee’s right not to be terminated for seeking benefits or breach of 
                                                 
 344. Id. at 353–54 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1022(b) (2000) and 29 C.F.R. § 2520.102-3 (2004)). 
 345. See id. at 351–54. 
 346. Id. at 345, 357. 
 347. Id. at 355–57. 
 348. Diamond v. Local 807 Labor-Mgmt. Pension Fund, No. 12-CV-5559 (RRM)(VVP), 2014 
WL 527898, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 2014). But see Weiner v. Klais & Co., Inc., 108 F.3d 86, 91–
92 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding fiduciary claims are subject to administrative exhaustion to prevent 
nullification of the exhaustion requirement). 
 349. Park v. Tr. of 1199 SEIU Health Care Emps. Pension Fund, 418 F. Supp. 2d 343, 357 
(S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
 350. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (2012).  There are multiple Supreme Court decisions that illustrate 
the Court’s perspective on the scope of equitable relief.  See Sereboff v. Mid-Atlantic Medical 
Servs., Inc., 547 U.S. 356, 361 (2006); Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 
204, 209 (2002); Harris Tr. & Sav. Bank v. Solomon Smith Barney, Inc., 530 U.S. 238, 243 (2000); 
Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 515 (1996); Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 261–
63 (1993); Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 148–49 (1985) (Brennan, J., 
concurring). 
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fiduciary duty.351  Claims that do not arise because of the terms of the plan, are 
appropriately addressed under § 1132(a)(3), the one providing for “other 
appropriate equitable relief.”352 
Equitable relief is possible under the following conditions: first, establishment 
of beneficiary status; second, exhaustion of administrative means or proven 
futility as applicable; and third, establishment of an equitable claim.353  The 
Second Circuit ruled that plan administrators may be sued as defendants under 
§ 1132(a)(3), providing for equitable relief whenever there is inadequate relief 
provided in other sections of ERISA.354  The pivotal elements necessary to 
support liability is that the plan administrators exercised total control over the 
claims process.355  The equitable remedies provided by § 1132(a)(3) are meant 
to supplement remedies that are inadequate to compensate the plaintiff for a 
defendant’s breach of fiduciary duty.356  Thus, money awards are available under 
§ 1132(a)(3), but “only in very limited circumstances.”357  Examples are, 
equitable restitution for loss resulting from a trustee’s breach of fiduciary duty, 
or to prevent the trustee’s unjust enrichment.358  If, as Professor Langbein 
suggests, ERISA was enacted with minimalist language to permit inclusion of 
all forms of equitable relief available under the law of trusts, then § 1132(a)(3) 
should be read inclusively, allowing arguments to retrieve proceeds from 
persons unjustly enriched through the breach of fiduciary responsibility of plan 
managers. 
The extent of equitable relief under § 1132(a)(3) is the primary issue.  It 
remains uncertain how far courts will go, under the terms of the ERISA, to 
provide equity to persons clearly intended by the plan participant to receive 
benefits but who were thwarted by mistake, inadequate information, and the 
                                                 
 351. Shamoun v. Bd. of Trs., 357 F. Supp. 2d 598, 603 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (citing Kennedy v. 
Empire Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 989 F.2d 588, 594 (2d Cir. 1993)); see also Nechis v. Oxford 
Health Plans, 421 F.3d 96, 102 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding plaintiffs’ lack of standing prevented Nechis 
from stating a legally cognizable claim, and that therefore the court did not need to decide whether 
administrative exhaustion was a prerequisite to a statutory ERISA claim); Wegmann v. Young 
Adult Institute, Inc., No. 15 Civ. 3815 (KPF), 2016 WL 8711557, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 5, 2016) 
(concurring with the holding of Shamoun, but holding that failure to exhaust would frustrate the 
goals of ERISA). 
 352. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3). 
 353. See, e.g., Wegmann, 2016 WL 8711557, at *2–3 (holding plaintiff must exhaust 
administrative remedies under ERISA prior to bringing an action under §1132(a)(1)(B)). 
 354. See N.Y. State Psychiatric Ass’n, v. UnitedHealth Grp., 798 F.3d 125, 133 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 355. Id. 
 356. Id. at 134. 
 357. Laurent v. PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, No. 06-CV-2280 (JPO), 2017 WL 3142067, at 
*7 (S.D.N.Y. July 24, 2017); see also Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 256 (1993) (holding 
equitable relief under § 1132(a)(3) is equitable in nature, and therefore injunction, mandamus, and 
restitution are options).  But see Langbein, supra note 1, at 1320 (arguing that “‘equitable relief’ 
should be correctly interpreted to include money damages”). 
 358. See Laurent, 2017 WL 3142067, at *9 (citing CIGNA Corp. v. Amara, 563 U.S. 421, 
441–42 (2011)). 
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plan’s designated beneficiary rule.  Several questions naturally follow: Is it 
possible for the courts to reform the terms of a plan document?359  What level of 
proof is required?  Who may bring suit to reform the document?  In a 2014 
decision, the Second Circuit ruled a contract may be reformed due to mistake of 
both parties, or where one of the parties is mistaken and the other commits fraud 
or engages in inequitable conduct.360  These remedies are available under federal 
common law, justifying reformation under equity principles whenever necessary 
to rectify fraud or to correct mutual mistake.361  Also in 2014, the Ninth Circuit 
ruled on a petition to reform an ERISA plan based on a plaintiff’s mistaken belief 
of the terms of the plan.362  The plaintiff petitioned based on equitable estoppel 
or reformation on the basis that the ERISA plan administrator erroneously 
informed him that he would receive benefits upon retirement, even though he 
released his claim to benefits several years prior.363  The plan discovered its error 
and ceased payment, causing the plaintiff economic hardship.364  The plaintiff 
then sought to apply equitable estoppel to prevent the fund from reverting to its 
corrected understanding of the terms of the plan.365  The court refused to apply 
equitable estoppel, ruling against the claimant’s petition to reform the terms of 
the plan, writing:  
We next turn to Gabriel’s claim that he is entitled to the equitable 
remedy of reformation.  To qualify for reformation of the Plan based 
on mistake under trust or contract law principles, Gabriel would need 
to demonstrate that “a mistake of fact or law affected the terms” of the 
Plan, the relevant trust instrument here, and introduce evidence of the 
trust settlor’s (or contractual parties’) true intent.  Gabriel cannot meet 
this standard as a matter of law, because the Plan itself does not 
contain an error.  Gabriel concedes that he was a sole proprietor of 
Twin Cities from 1975 to 1978 and ineligible to participate in the Plan 
during that time, and therefore the Fund’s current, corrected records 
accurately reflect the agreement between Gabriel and the Fund.  
Instead, Gabriel wants to reform the Fund’s administrative records to 
conform to the misinformation provided by the plan representative.  
But reformation does not extend so far.  The administrative records 
are not part of the Plan, and the Fund’s mistaken administrative 
                                                 
 359. See, e.g., Nechis v. Oxford Health Plans, 421 F.3d 96, 103 (2d Cir. 2005) (suggesting in 
dicta that reformation is possible when there is fraud, mutual mistake, or terms in violation of 
ERISA).  But see DeVito v. Pension Plan of Local 819 I.B.T. Pension Fund, 975 F. Supp. 258, 273 
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding that a court may order a defendant to reform a plan in violation of ERISA 
but may not rule on the court’s power to reform an ERISA pension plan). 
 360. Amara v. CIGNA Corp., 775 F.3d 510, 525–26 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 361. Id. at 525–26. 
 362. See Gabriel v. Alaska Elec. Pension Fund, 773 F.3d 945, 952 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 363. Id. at 949, 951. 
 364. Id. at 951–52. 
 365. Id. at 952. 
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records did not reflect the parties’ true intent in entering into the Plan.  
Accordingly, the remedy of reformation due to mistake is not 
applicable in this context.366 
Judicial reformation allows courts to accommodate the actual intent of the 
decedent and is available only in cases of fraud or mistake, not “to impose 
personal liability . . . for a contractual obligation to pay money—relief that was 
not typically available in equity.”367  What if a plan administrator failed to advise 
an employee, or failed to make inquiry to update information from an employee, 
is the plan manager in breach of his or her fiduciary responsibility?  Courts hold 
that when an employer advises employees to make certain elections related to 
employee benefits, that the employer acted as a fiduciary in that context because 
the employer was acting as a plan administrator.368  Failing to advise or to make 
inquiry is discretionary, another element of fiduciary responsibility.369  It may 
be easier to hold that an employer breaches fiduciary duty when he or she 
intentionally misrepresents facts resulting in injury to an employee.  The more 
difficult issue is whether the employer breaches his or her fiduciary duty when 
he or she negligently misrepresents facts that result in employee injury.  
Negligent misrepresentation is actionable as a breach of fiduciary duty. 
Negligent misrepresentation was one of the issues raised in a 2011 district 
court decision, Fadely v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Georgia, Inc..370  The facts 
involved an employee with substantial health problems who was terminated by 
his company shortly after his sixty-fifth birthday.371  Following his termination, 
the employer advised the employee to enroll in COBRA rather than Medicare 
Part B, to which he was entitled.372  Relying upon the employer’s advice, the 
employee enrolled in COBRA and as a result, suffered substantial financial 
costs.373  Thereupon the employee sued his employer, alleging breach of the duty 
owned him under ERISA.374  Specifically, that his employer owed a fiduciary 
duty to him as a former employee and that the employer: (1) refused to provide 
                                                 
 366. See id. at 961–62 (citations omitted). 
 367. Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 210 (2002); see also In re 
Estate of Duke, 352 P.3d 863, 867 (Cal. 2015) (holding that “reformation is permissible if clear and 
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the testator’s actual specific intent at the time the will was drafted”). 
 368. See Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 492, 502–03 (1996) (holding employers engaged 
in deliberate deception by advising employees to accept a change of plan, which was to the 
employees’ financial detriment). 
 369. Pohl v. Nat’l Benefits Consultants, Inc., 956 F.2d 126, 128–29 (7th Cir. 1992). 
 370. Fadely v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ga., Inc., No. 1:11-CV-1409-TWT, 2011 
WL4974857, at *1, *4 (N.D. Ga. 2011); see also Pledger v. Reliance Tr. Co., 240 F. Supp. 3d 
1314, 1336 (N.D. Ga. 2017) (holding plaintiff must specify how § 1132(a)(3) applies for the court 
to grant relief). 
 371. Fadely, 2011 WL4974857, at *1. 
 372. Id. 
 373. Id. 
 374. Id. 
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him with requested information; (2) made misrepresentations; (3) breached its 
duty to him based on these misrepresentations; (4) failed to notify him on a 
timely basis of an adverse benefit determination; (5) failed to provide specific 
plan provisions that were pertinent to him; and (6) failed to provide a description 
of the review appeals process.375 
The court permitted the former employee to proceed with his claim of breach 
of fiduciary duty through negligent misrepresentation.376  Similarly, in 2014, 
another federal district court permitted a plaintiff to proceed with a claim based 
on negligent misrepresentation and brought under § 1132(a)(3).377  The court 
wrote: 
Jump plainly has met this standard for pleading purposes as to 
Northern Tier.  He alleges that Northern Tier misled him beginning in 
December 2010 by providing him with information stating that he 
would be eligible for subsidized health benefits under the Northern 
Tier plan.  Northern Tier argues that Jump does not allege that he read 
the presentation materials at issue, but the Complaint clearly alleges 
otherwise.  Jump alleges that he was further misled by Northern Tier’s 
September 2011 presentation, which expressly states that Northern 
Tier will ‘recognize Speedway service for eligibility and vesting in 
benefit plans [.]’ Although the latter presentation did not specifically 
address the subsidy, Jump alleges that he believed that Northern Tier’s 
failure to address the subsidy meant that the December 2010 statement 
remained accurate.  Jump further alleges that Northern Tier never 
disclosed that a subsidy would not be available to Jump before he 
decided to join Northern Tier.  Finally, Jump alleges that Northern 
Tier’s misrepresentations and omissions led him to terminate his 
employment with Speedway and join Northern Tier to his detriment.  
He claims that he would have simply retired from Speedway had he 
known that he was not entitled to a subsidy under the Northern Tier 
Plan.378 
Both federal court decisions illustrate the possibility of alleging a violation of 
an employer’s duty to provide employees with comprehensive plan information 
forms and complementary follow-up throughout employment.  Arguably, failure 
to provide these necessary elements results in action under § 1132(a)(3), “to 
obtain other appropriate equitable relief . . . ,” permitting recovery under a theory 
of negligent misrepresentation.  Cases also illustrate that the universe of 
potential defendants in an equitable breach of fiduciary duty lawsuit (§ 
1132(a)(3)) is larger than the universe of potential defendants in a claim to 
                                                 
 375. Id. 
 376. Id. at *4–6. 
 377. Jump v. Speedway LLC, 23 F. Supp. 3d 1024, 1030–31 (D. Minn. 2014). 
 378. Id. at 1031 (citations omitted). 
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recover benefits under the terms of the plan (§ 1132(a)(1)(B))—with plaintiffs 
to recover losses more easily and with expanded standing. 
C. Accountability 
ERISA strives for certainty and simplicity.379  Born from the goals established 
by Congressional committees meeting during the 1950s and 1960, concurrent 
with federal departments and presidential commissions, their priority remains to 
provide employees with secure pension and welfare benefits, and concomitantly 
to provide employers with tax incentives to incentivize employee stability and 
security.  Certainty underlies federal preemption of contradictory state laws and 
procedures, guaranteeing income for surviving spouses and children, and 
reliance upon the ERISA plan manager to administer the plan “solely in the 
interest of the participants and beneficiaries . . . ,”380 avoiding self-serving 
behavior.381  To ensure certainty and simplicity, plan managers are expected to 
exercise skill and care and the diligence of a prudent person acting in like 
capacity.382  Most pertinently, plan managers owe a duty to inform plan 
participants and beneficiaries about significant aspects of trust administration,383 
the imprudent response to which is illustrated in the ongoing judicial controversy 
surrounding revocation by operation of law.384 
What is the extent of a plan manager’s fiduciary duty to disclose to plan 
participants the significant aspects of the plan?  At a minimum, the plan manager 
may not intentionally mislead, deceive, or fraudulently induce.385  In a 2003 
decision from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, the court 
discussed the responsibility of the plan manager to disclose significant facts to 
the plan participants.386  The court considered the opinions of other circuits as 
well as the pertinent fiduciary decisions from the United States Supreme 
Court.387  The facts of the Fifth Circuit case involved company employees who 
inquired of their employer’s representatives “whether the company planned to 
implement an enhanced retirement incentive program . . . .”388  The company 
managers told the employees that they knew nothing of any plan and, based on 
                                                 
 379. See, e.g., Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 497 (1996) (“Congress’[s] desire to offer 
employees enhanced protection for their benefits, on the one hand, and, on the other, its desire not 
to create a system that is so complex that administrative costs, or litigation expenses, unduly 
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 380. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (2012). 
 381. Id. § 1106(b)(1). 
 382. Id. § 1104(a)(1)(B); see Cent. States, Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Fund v. Cent. Transp., 
Inc., 472 U.S. 559, 571 (1985). 
 383. See, e.g., Fischer v. Phila. Elec. Co., 994 F.2d 130, 133 (3d Cir. 1993); Berlin v. Mich. 
Bell Tel. Co., 858 F.2d 1154, 1163–64 (6th Cir. 1988). 
 384. See Langbein, supra note 1, at 1326–27. 
 385. Martinez v. Schlumberger, Ltd., 338 F.3d 407, 415, 430 (5th Cir. 2003). 
 386. Id. at 430–31. 
 387. Id. at 429–30. 
 388. Id. at 409. 
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this information, the employees took an early retirement rather than wait for an 
incentive program.389  One month later, the company announced an incentivized 
early retirement program that provided an additional year’s salary, but the now-
retired former employees, missed this opportunity based on the employer’s 
information leading them to retirement.390  The employees filed suit against the 
company alleging the employer’s representatives breached their fiduciary duty 
by defrauding them.391 
The Fifth Circuit ruled the company did not owe an affirmative duty to 
disclose to the plan participants the status of its internal discussions concerning 
a change in the retirement program.392  Hence, the statements made by company 
managers did not constitute a material misrepresentation and therefore, were not 
fraudulent.393  But the decision goes further by outlining the parameters of a plan 
manager’s duty to disclose on a broader scale.394  The opinion begins its analysis 
with the acknowledgement that ERISA’s fiduciary duties rely upon the common 
law of trusts.395  The court then proceeds to review a 1996 Supreme Court 
decision, Varity Corporation v. Howe.396  While the Court in Varity held it was 
a breach of fiduciary duty for a company employee to intentionally mislead an 
employee, the decision declined to address “whether ERISA fiduciaries have 
any fiduciary duty to disclose truthful information . . . in response to employee 
inquiries.”397  What then is the fiduciary responsibility of a plan administrator to 
provide employees with information concerning ERISA plans?  The Fifth 
Circuit suggest that the duty to disclose in a neutral fashion under ERISA is 
vague, writing “that the Supreme Court, while not having spoken on this precise 
question, has defined in general terms an employer’s responsibility to 
communicate truthfully with its employees regarding the future of benefit 
plans.”398  But then, “Congress had no need to spell out the details, and 
considerable reason not to do so when legislating for a new field whose contours 
were not yet fully known.”399 
                                                 
 389. Id. 
 390. Id. 
 391. Martinez v. Schlumberger, Ltd., 338 F.3d 407, 409 (5th Cir. 2003). 
 392. Id. at 432. 
 393. Id. at 431–32.  The court specified that it held only that “the lack of serious consideration 
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 395. Id. at 411. 
 396. Id. at 413–16 (summarizing Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489 (1996)). 
 397. Varity Corp., 516 U.S. at 506. 
 398. Martinez v. Schlumberger, Ltd., 338 F.3d 407, 413 (5th Cir. 2003). 
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ERISA is silent, noting that equitable powers should be read broadly, and that ERISA’s language 
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Empirical evidence sufficiently indicates that employment forms affecting 
pension and welfare benefits offer inadequate choices by which employees may 
express their intent within a continually changing interpersonal milieu.400  
Furthermore, estate planning attorneys consulting with divorcing clients, 
committed nonmarital clients, or estate planning clients are inexperienced with 
ERISA’s preemption and its consequences.401  Do these occurrences justify 
accusing either the plan managers or estate planning attorneys with a breach of 
fiduciary responsibility to their clients?  If failure to provide an employee with 
adequate means by which he or she may express intent regarding the distribution 
of fund proceeds, then the answer is certainly yes.  This is true regardless if the 
payment arises from either a pension or a welfare plan administered under 
ERISA, “Congress deliberately included nonpension plans within ERISA’s 
fiduciary and remedy provisions, and Congress took no distinction within 
ERISA remedy law between pension and nonpension plans.”402 
Professor Langbein is of the opinion that “courts that interpret ERISA should 
be hesitant to conclude that remedies routinely available in pre-ERISA trust law 
fall outside the meaning of Congress’ authorization of ‘equitable relief’ under 
ERISA.”403  Traditionally, Professor Langbein argues: 
An aggrieved trust beneficiary may sue . . . either in his or her own 
right or on behalf of the trust.  He or she may recover (1) for loss 
incurred, (2) for any profits that the trustee made in breach of trust, 
and (3) for any gains that would have accrued but for the breach.404 
The wording used by Congress in § 1132(a)(3), entitling a participant, 
beneficiary, or fiduciary to obtain “other appropriate equitable relief” was 
intended to “facilitate adaptation to new problems that might be encountered as 
ERISA transposed trust remedy law to the novel terrain of pension and benefit 
plans.”405  Apparently, in support, Supreme Court decisions refer to this ERISA 
provision as a safety net, offering relief not otherwise adequately met.406 
Justice Scalia’s 2003 decision in Mertens v. Hewitt Associates, seemingly 
restrains the equitable relief available under ERISA.407  Over the objection of 
                                                 
 400. See, e.g., J. Frank Vespa-Papaleo et al., The Legal, Medical, Economic & Social 
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four dissenting justices, the majority holds monetary awards are not 
encompassed within the equitable relief referenced in ERISA § 1132(a)(3).408  
The majority opinion separates relief normally given at law and that normally 
given at equity, a duality long abandoned, “[m]oney damages are, of course, the 
classic form of legal relief.”409  Since the text of § 1132(a)(3) references 
equitable relief, Justice Scalia excludes monetary damages as a form of 
restitution.410  Contrary to the majority’s construction of equitable relief, 
Professor Langbein writes, “equity courts have constantly awarded money 
damages to remedy breach of trust, which is why the Uniform Trust Code of 
2000 has recently codified the practice.”411  While Mertens remains good law, it 
does not alter the issue of whether § 1132(a)(3) may be read to encompass the 
failure of plan managers to provide employees with adequate plan designation 
forms that encompass current intent and accommodate changing circumstances.  
Arguably, “the concept of ‘typically equitable’ has no ascertainable 
meaning.”412  As Professor Langbein writes: 
Because both the substantive and the remedial provisions of ERISA 
arise from trust law, the likely meaning of ‘appropriate equitable 
relief’ in ERISA is the panoply of remedies, specific and monetary, 
including make-whole damages for consequential injury, which courts 
of equity have for centuries applied to correct breaches of trust, and 
which are ‘other’ than the ‘benefits due’ and injunctive relief that the 
statute expressly authorizes earlier in [other provisions].413 
One instance of equitable relief applied consistently to ERISA plan designated 
beneficiaries involves slayer statutes.  These statutes apply to designated 
beneficiaries who receive the benefit because this same individual slayed the 
person from whom he or she would be taking.414  Nonetheless, state law provides 
that if a beneficiary “felonious[ly] and intentional[ly]” kills the person from 
whom he or she would take then that person is deemed to predecease the 
transferor and cannot take.415  The rationale for the slayer rule is that the 
transferor did not intend the beneficiary to take if the taking were a result of the 
beneficiary feloniously and intentionally killing the transferor.  There is no 
textual provision made in ERISA for voiding the taking of a beneficiary who 
                                                 
 408. Id. at 253 (“We note at the outset that it is far from clear that, even if this provision does 
make money damages available, it makes them available for the actions at issue here.”). 
 409. Id. at 255. 
 410. Id. 
 411. Langbein, supra note 1, at 1352 (citing UNIF. TRUST CODE § 1001(b)(3) (UNIF. LAW 
COMM’N 2001)). 
 412. Id. at 1353. 
 413. Id. at 1355. 
 414. See Langbein, supra note 5, at 1687. 
 415. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-803 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2014); see also Langbein, supra note 
5, at 1688 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 45 (AM. 
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slays the transferor, yet “[n]o reported ERISA or FEGLIA case has ever allowed 
the slayer to take.”416  Cases supporting federal preemption for other purposes 
acknowledge that in the “ERISA context, these ‘slayer’ statutes could revoke the 
beneficiary status of someone who murdered a plan participant.”417  Among 
commentators, there remains mystery as to why federal courts are willing to use 
slayer statutes to void a taking by “slayer beneficiaries,” but are unwilling to use 
state statutes permitting revocation by operation of law upon divorce to void a 
divorced spouse from taking.418 
The comparison between statutes mandating revocation by operation of law 
and the equitable voiding of the beneficiary status of slayers focuses on the 
unjust enrichment of beneficiaries.419  Even though courts hold that state 
divorces, and the subsequent financial settlements agreed to by both divorcing 
parties, are preempted by ERISA’s requirement that proceeds be paid to the 
plan’s designated beneficiary, the intent of the employee was that the former 
spouse not be the beneficiary.420  AAnd although federal courts refuse to permit 
state constructive trusts to alter distribution of ERISA proceeds,421 there is dicta 
suggesting not all equity devices are forbidden, only those arising at the state 
level, thereby suggesting that a federal approach is suitable.422  The Ninth 
Circuit, in dicta, speculated in 2010 that: 
We conclude that Congress did not intend to permit the reassignment 
of surviving spouse benefits and, therefore the constructive trust 
remedy that the state court tried to impose is also preempted by 
ERISA.  It may not be that all constructive trusts instituted by state 
courts, particularly those that seek to recover ill-gotten gains, will have 
a sufficient connection with or reference to an ERISA plan to trigger 
ERISA’s preemption provision.423 
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Thus, a constructive trust, a remedy used to provide redress for the unjust 
enrichment of a beneficiary, may be the proper equitable vehicle under § 
1132(a)(3), by which to recover assets passing to a person unjustly enriched 
because of the plan manager’s failure to inform. 
Ostensibly, the best approach is to utilize the ERISA statute itself, specifically 
§ 1132(a)(3), which provides for a participant or a beneficiary to obtain other 
appropriate equitable relief to redress violations of the participant’s plan.  First, 
recourse is possible against plan managers for failing to provide employment 
forms that sufficiently provide participants with knowledgeable options when 
commencing employment, and then periodic updates to ascertain changes in the 
participant’s intent.  As fiduciaries, the plan managers owe a fiduciary duty to 
the plan participants, a duty that is breached when there is inadequate 
information disseminated to employees by which employees may make 
intelligent decisions.  Second, it is arguable that when plan proceeds are paid to 
designated beneficiaries who knowingly waived all claim to those proceeds, that 
named beneficiary is unjustly enriched by receipt of the proceeds.  There exists 
extensive history of unjust enrichment in state courts, but § 1132(a)(3) provides 
the appropriate equitable relief justification for voiding the payment of those 
proceeds to persons who are unjustly enriched. 
The catalyst for resorting to the equitable remedy language of ERISA results 
from a congruence of the following events: 
First, federal courts consistently refuse to establish limits to the preemption 
force of ERISA as applied to the states through the Supremacy Clause.424  The 
future extent of federal ERISA preemption remains uncertain,425 but among the 
federal circuits and repeatedly in the Supreme Court, efforts to apply state law 
to ERISA plans, even laws traditionally left to the states for decades, like family 
law and probate, are preempted to provide ease of plan administration.  
Arguments suggesting that states can accommodate ERISA’s goal of ease of 
administration because, for the most part, state laws are uniformly similar, are 
suspicious indeed. As one commentator noted, “the downside of state laws is 
that they offer administrators no single prototype to follow.  What is more, state 
laws of disclaimer have steadily fragmented over time.”426  Furthermore: 
[T]he uniform acts for inheritance and disclaimer law, first 
promulgated in 1969, have, if anything, exacerbated the tropism 
toward diversity.  Unlike the Uniform Commercial Code, the Uniform 
Probate Code and related products have never gained anything close 
to universal adoption, but they did succeed in stirring things up, 
encouraging more states to codify and to reexamine and fiddle with 
                                                 
 424. Richard C. Ausness, Preemption of State Tort Law by Federal Safety Statutes: Supreme 
Court Preemption Jurisprudence Since Cipollone, 92 KY. L.J. 913, 915–16 n.14 (2004). 
 425. See, e.g., Hillman, 133 S. Ct. at 1955–58 (Thomas, J., concurring) (implying preemption 
should be used sparingly). 
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statutes already in place . . . .  As of today, some seventeen states have 
enacted the latest version of the Uniform Probate Code’s provisions 
on disclaimer (grafted into that code from a freestanding uniform 
act)—and these have proliferated into seventeen different variations 
of state laws.427 
Second, arguments in favor of restricting federal preemption are consistently 
rejected.428 More specifically, the arguments assert that: (1) the designated plan 
beneficiary rule jeopardizes elective share statutes enacted to promote spousal 
equality; (2) preemption conflicts with spousal waivers arising as part of divorce 
decrees incorporated but not merged into divorce judgments; and (3) preemption 
ignores the perceived intent of the plan participant.  These arguments are 
repeatedly debunked. 
Third, because the plan proceeds are paid through nonprobate transfer 
mechanisms, plan contracts involving pension and welfare benefits, at the 
federal law level, do not match modern state laws that provide for revocation of 
named beneficiaries upon divorce.  These state statutes were enacted to apply to 
all mechanisms but remain unexpressed in the plan designation rule of ERISA, 
“[t]he [state] divorce revocation statutes exemplify the core policy value of state 
wealth transfer law, which is to implement the transferor’s intent.”429 
Fourth, plan managers are not providing accountholders with forms that 
adequately prompt them to foresee and account for significant life changes that 
might alter their preferences: “an intelligent and careful nonlawyer reading these 
forms would have difficulty understanding the potential impact they could have 
on distribution of account assets.”430  The plethora of lawsuits involving 
individuals other than designated beneficiaries of ERISA plans, combined with 
the multiplication of judicial decisions, suggests that plan administrators are 
negligent in managing plan documents.  Specifically, plan managers are 
negligent in “respecting management or disposition of [plan] assets.”431  
Furthermore, as with investing assets, the plan managers owe a duty to monitor 
and investigate and then to act in a prudent manner.432  There is at least a glimmer 
that the Supreme Court may be willing to adopt a more aggressive posture 
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toward plan managers acting in a fiduciary capacity,433 certainly when coupled 
with the reoccurring fact that the pension holder’s intended beneficiaries are 
deprived of plan benefits because of the managers’ failure to inform.434  Section 
1132(a)(3) provides a mechanism by which mistakes may be corrected without 
resorting to state law, preemption analysis, or the unjust enrichment of 
unintended beneficiaries. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
When ERISA was enacted in 1974 it was the product of public discussion and 
intense deliberation, all meant to provide American workers with a fiscally 
sound and administratively simple plan by which to safely plan for retirement.  
Likewise, it provided employers with tax incentives and a bold initiative to 
stimulate worker productivity and employment stability.  These goals were 
accomplished.  To manage the pension and welfare plans envisioned by ERISA, 
Congress mandated efficiency, dodging varying state laws through federal 
preemption, specifying what is now known as the plan beneficiary designation 
rule.  Without anticipation, society evolved.  No-fault divorce precipitated a 
significant rise in the number of divorces and remarriages, gender equality took 
hold of spouses, and the transfer of wealth shifted from probate devices, such as 
a last will and testament, to nonprobate contract beneficiaries, common with 
pension funds and life insurance policies.  What remains constant, are the 
mistakes that individuals make, often planning to update contracts and forms, 
but mistakenly waiting until it is too late.  The road to hell is paved with good 
intentions. 
Sadly, human mistakes became entangled with ERISA’s preemption of state 
laws, the plan beneficiary designation rule, and the frequency of divorce.  States 
enacted laws specifying that if a person divorces, the former spouse is treated as 
predeceased for purposes of inheritance under last wills and testaments, but also 
under nonprobate contracts.  The public and attorneys practicing estate planning 
and divorce law became familiar with these state laws and perhaps mistakenly 
relied upon them to their detriment.  ERISA did not accommodate revocation by 
divorce within its terms and as a result, many former spouses received pension 
and life insurance benefits from former spouses.  This reality precipitated 
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multiple cases in state and federal courts arguing for state law’s application, that 
federal common law can accommodate state law, or that former spouses should 
be equitably estopped from receiving proceeds that were intentionally waived.  
To date, all of these arguments are to no avail.  The cases are legion. 
ERISA plan managers are presumptively aware of disconnect between a plan 
holder’s intent and the plan beneficiary designation rule.  Nonetheless, very few 
plan managers provide forms used by plan holders adequately explaining the 
current and future options that employees may consider when designating a 
beneficiary.  Furthermore, very few plan managers periodically make inquiry of 
plan holders as to changes in designation intent or current status arrangements. 
These failures result in the unjust enrichment of unintended beneficiaries, a 
failure of plan managers to inform, make inquiry, and to assist plan holders 
express a conscious and informed consent.  This Article argues that this breach 
of fiduciary duty is actionable under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) of ERISA, which 
provides that a participant, beneficiary, or a fiduciary may obtain appropriate 
equitable relief to redress this breach.  Rather than lament encroaching 
federalism, the failure of Congress to act, or the unintentionality of human 
mistakes, this Article argues for holding plan managers to the accountability 
ERISA envisions as the best guarantee to reverse the number of unintended 
beneficiaries of pension and insurance policies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
